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LEWIS V. UNITED STATES: A REQUIEM FOR
AGGREGATION
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantees
citizens the right to a trial by jury in all criminal prosecutions.1 The
Supreme Court has limited this right by applying it only to the prosecu-
tion of "serious, ' and not "petty,"3 offenses.4 This qualification balances
1. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
Id.
There is a difference between the language of the Sixth Amendment, which uses the
phrase "criminal prosecutions," and Article III, Section 2, Clause 3, which uses "Trial of all
Crimes." Compare id. amend VI, with id. art. III, § 2, cl. 3. The difference between the
two constitutional provisions has received some attention in academic literature, but has
been treated as having no interpretive consequence. See Felix Frankfurter & Thomas G.
Corcoran, Petty Federal Offenses and the Constitutional Guaranty of Trial by Jury, 39
HARV. L. REv. 917, 968-75 (1926).
Article III, Section 2, Clause 3 of the Constitution provides in full:
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and
such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been com-
mitted; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place
or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
2. An offense is serious if the legislature has authorized a minimum time of imprison-
ment of over six months for its commission. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 &
n.6 (1970). An offense that otherwise would be considered petty may be treated as a seri-
ous offense by a court if it determines that additional statutory penalties, when read in
conjunction with the maximum authorized prison sentence, demonstrate that the legisla-
ture considered the offense to be serious. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05
(8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a mandatory 15-year revocation of a drivers' license for a third
conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) showed that the legisla-
ture determined that the offense was serious even though the maximum authorized prison
sentence made the offense presumptively petty); see also infra note 92 (discussing Richter).
3. An offense is presumed to be petty if the maximum authorized prison term for its
commission is six months or less. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543
(1989). Under federal law, a petty offense is a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misde-
meanor, or an infraction. See 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (defining a petty offense); id.
§ 3559(a)(7)-(9) (1994) (defining penalties for Class B and C misdemeanors and infrac-
tions). A fine imposed for a petty offense may not exceed an amount set forth in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3571(b)(6) or (7) for individuals, or an amount set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(7) for
organizations. See id. § 19. But see United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379 (7th Cir.),
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the defendant's right to a jury trial with the state's interest in efficiently
administering its judicial system.
5
Courts apply an objective test when determining whether an offense is
serious or petty,6 the most relevant factor being the maximum prison
term authorized by the legislature for a particular offense.7 Offenses car-
rying a prison term of more than six months are defined as "serious," and
defendants charged with them are entitled to a trial by jury.8 Those car-
rying a sentence of six months or less are presumed to be petty.9 Absent
a showing of significant additional statutory penalties, a defendant
charged with a petty offense is not entitled to a trial by jury.' °
cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996) (holding that a maximum fine of $10,000 for a presump-
tively petty offense did not make that offense serious).
In some states, there exists a scheme by which a defendant may be tried without a jury
for a petty offense, and if convicted, may appeal and request a trial de novo before a jury.
See RICHARD B. MCNAMARA, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 17.02 (1982). This type of structure does not violate the defendant's Sixth Amendment
jury trial rights. See Ludwig v. Massachusetts, 427 U.S. 618, 630 (1976); see also Haar v.
Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1550-51 & n.15 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing New Mexico's statu-
tory trial de novo provisions and the Ludwig decision).
4. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,159 (1968). Despite the clear import of the
jury trial provisions in the Constitution and the Bill of Rights, scholars have analyzed the
history of these two provisions and have generally agreed that the framers of the Constitu-
tion intended to provide a trial by jury only for those crimes that were considered "seri-
ous" at common law. See Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 968-75. See generally
JAMES C. CISSELL, FEDERAL CRIMINAL TRIALS § 1240 (3d ed. 1992 & Supp. 1995) (discuss-
ing how to differentiate between a petty offense and a serious offense to determine
whether a defendant has a right to a trial by jury). But see III ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 15-1.1 (2d ed. 1980)[hereinafter ABA STANDARDS] (proposing that
the right to a trial by jury, "should be available to a party ... in criminal prosecutions in
which confinement in jail or prison may be imposed," as the drafters argued that the right
to a trial by jury was so fundamental in our system of justice that it should be unrestricted
(emphasis added)).
5. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (reasoning that the benefits of efficient management
of the criminal justice system outweighed the consequences defendants charged with petty
offenses faced).
6. See District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 628 (1937) (holding that courts
should examine objective standards of the seriousness of an offense in determining
whether a defendant is entitled to a trial by jury).
7. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 68 (1970) (finding that the maximum au-
thorized prison sentence was the most relevant and objective criteria of whether an offense
was petty or serious).
8. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 73-74 (holding that crimes punishable by more than six
months in prison are "serious" and persons charged with them are entitled to a trial by
jury); Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161-62 (holding that the crime of simple battery, punishable in
Louisiana by a maximum of two years in prison, was "serious" and that the defendant was
entitled to a trial by jury).
9. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
10. See id. (finding that a defendant charged with a petty offense is not entitled to a
jury trial, unless he can show that significant statutory penalties viewed along with the
authorized prison term indicate that the legislature viewed the offense as serious).
1058
1997] Aggregation of Sentences 1059
Situations have arisen where a defendant is charged with more than
one petty offense.'1 In such cases, courts have noted that the trial judge's
prerogative to impose consecutive sentences potentially exposed such a
defendant to an aggregate sentence of more than six months in prison.12
In light of this possibility, those courts held that defendants charged with
multiple petty offenses were entitled to a jury trial. 3
Courts allowing for a trial by jury in multiple petty offense prosecutions
fell into two categories. One group took an objective view, reasoning
that a defendant had an absolute right to a trial by jury when charged
with multiple petty offenses because he potentially faced, in the aggre-
gate, more than six months in prison if consecutive sentences were im-
posed.' 4 This was labeled an "objective" approach to aggregation,
because it allowed for a strict determination of the right to a jury trial
A mandatory 15-year revocation of a drivers' license for a third conviction for driving
under the influence of alcohol has been held to be a significantly severe statutory penalty
that, when read alongside a three to six month prison term, made a presumptively petty
offense a serious one. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1990).
Terms of parole that may be imposed at the discretion of the sentencing judge, however,
are not sufficient to show that the offense was considered serious. See United States v.
Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1993) (per curiam). Moreover, a fine in excess of the maximum
fine authorized for a petty offense has been held not to make an offense serious. See
United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996).
11. See, e.g, United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 846 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S.
Ct. 2580 (1996) (defendant charged with two petty offenses); United States v. Lewis, 65
F.3d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (same); United States v. Coppins,
953 F.2d 86, 87 (4th Cir. 1991) (defendant charged with three petty offenses); United States
v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991) (defendant charged with four petty
offenses).
12. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255; Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90; Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1514; see
also 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994) ("If multiple terms of imprisonment are imposed at the
same time . . . the terms may run concurrently or consecutively." (emphasis added)).
13. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (holding that a defendant charged with multiple petty
offenses arising from the same incident was entitled to a trial by jury when the aggregate
prison sentence faced exceeded six months); Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th
Cir. 1987) (same); Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1553 (10th Cir. 1983) (recognizing that
a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses has a jury trial right if threatened at the
start of trial with more than six months in prison); United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380,
382 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses arising
out of the same criminal transaction has a right to a jury trial); United States v. Musgrave,
695 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Va. 1988) (same); United States v. Coleman, 664 F. Supp.
548, 549 (D.D.C. 1985) (same); United States v. O'Connor, 660 F. Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga.
1987) (same); State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990) (same).
14. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (holding that if consecutive sentences were imposed,
the appellant faced fifteen months in prison, and as a result, was entitled to a trial by jury
because the potential prison term exceeded the six month maximum sentence for a petty
offense); Sanchez, 786 P.2d at 46 (finding that an objective measure was in accord with the
constitutional jury trial guarantees).
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based solely upon the number of petty offenses charged. 15 A second
group of courts adopted a "subjective" approach, allowing for aggrega-
tion of petty offenses and a trial by jury only when a defendant actually
faced more than six months in prison at the outset of the trial.16 Thus,
under the subjective approach, the jury trial right could be extinguished
through a pretrial commitment by the trial judge not to sentence the de-
fendant to more than six months in prison.
17
Other courts, however, adopted neither the objective nor the subjective
approach, and refused to allow defendants charged with multiple petty
offenses a jury trial under any circumstances.18 These courts reasoned
that, under the petty offense doctrine, the definition of an offense as petty
determines whether a defendant has a right to a trial by jury-not the
number of times a defendant is accused of committing a petty offense.' 9
In Lewis v. United States,2" the Supreme Court resolved the conflict of
whether the petty offense doctrine permits a defendant charged with mul-
tiple petty offenses the right to a trial by jury.2' Ray Lewis was a United
States Postal Service employee who was charged with two counts of ob-
15. See Sanchez, 786 P.2d at 43. But see Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1517 (discussing and
declining to adopt the "objective" type of aggregation); see also infra notes 122-29 and
accompanying text (discussing the Bencheck case).
16. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1518 (giving a defendant charged with multiple petty
offenses the right to a trial by jury only when, at the beginning of trial, a defendant actually
faced more than six months in prison in the aggregate).
17. See id.; see also Rife, 814 F.2d at 565 (permitting a trial judge to deny a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses a jury trial, so long as the state later "remedied" this
denial by re-sentencing the defendant to no more than six months in prison); cf III ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 15-1.2(a)-(b) & commentary at 16-17, 20-21 (proposing that
a defendant be allowed to "waive" a trial by jury right "with the consent of the prosecutor,
... [if] advised by the court of his or right to trial by jury, [and the defendant] personally
waives the right to trial by jury, either in writing or in open court for the record").
18. See United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 847 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2580 (1996).
19. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254-56 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct.
2163, 2168 (1996) (holding that a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses was not
entitled to a trial by jury as petty offenses are excluded from the Sixth Amendment right to
a jury trial); Brown, 71 F.3d at 847 (holding that only serious crimes trigger the protection
of the Sixth Amendment right to a trial by jury, and not the presence of multiple petty
offenses that possibly could place the defendant in jail for a significant period of time).
20. 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
21. See id. at 2168.
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struction of the mails22 -a crime that carries a maximum penalty of no
more than six months in prison 23 and a fine of up to $5,000.24
Prior to the commencement of trial, Lewis requested a trial by jury.25
The magistrate judge, however, denied the request, stating that she would
not sentence him to more than six months in prison if convicted.26 Lewis
was convicted on both counts and received three years probation on each
count, with the sentences to run concurrently.27 He appealed his denial
of a trial by jury, arguing that he had faced the possibility of more than
six months in prison notwithstanding the trial court's pretrial commit-
ment.28 The magistrate judge's decision was affirmed by both the United
States District Court for the Eastern District of New York and the Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit.29
Noting a split between the Circuit Courts of Appeal, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari,30 and affirmed that Lewis was not entitled to a
trial by jury.31 The Court first reasoned that when Congress authorizes
an offense to carry a prison term of six months or less, the offense is
petty.32 The Court then indicated that a petty offense did not become a
serious offense simply because a defendant committed it multiple times.33
The Court, therefore, held that a defendant charged with multiple petty
offenses does not have a right to a trial by jury.34
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment,
and endorsed the subjective approach to aggregation, focusing on the fact
that it was proper for the trial judge to deny Lewis's jury trial request
because of her pretrial commitment not to impose a sentence of more
22. See id. at 2165. Lewis had been observed by postal inspectors removing the con-
tents of mail routed through his work station on two separate occasions. See id. Obstruc-
tion of the mails generally requires that the defendant "knowingly and willfully obstruct[ ]
or retard[ I the passage of the mail, or any carrier or conveyance carrying the mail." 18
U.S.C. § 1701 (1994).
23. See 18 U.S.C. § 1701.
24. See id. § 3571(b)(6).
25. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165.
26. See id.
27. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163
(1996).
28. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165.
29. See id. at 2166.
30. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 807 (1996).
31. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168. Justice O'Connor wrote the majority opinion, and
was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Souter, and Thomas. See id. at
2165.
32. See id. at 2166-67.
33. See id. at 2167.
34. See id. at 2168.
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than six months in prison. 35 The concurrence argued that in such a situa-
tion, a defendant does not face the stigma associated with a serious of-
fense, and thus is not entitled to a trial by jury.3 6 The concurrence,
however, charged that the majority's rationale would enable prosecutors
to routinely circumvent a defendant's jury trial right while simultaneously
seeking to impose serious penalties upon the defendant.37
Justices Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, dissented from
the Court's holding, agreeing with the concurrence that the Court had
done great damage to the right to a jury trial.38 The dissent, however,
disagreed with the concurrence's assertion that Lewis was properly de-
nied a trial by jury because of the pretrial commitment of the trial
judge. 39 The dissent argued that the right to a trial by jury attaches when
the prosecution commences, and that a defendant charged with multiple
petty offenses has an absolute right to a trial by jury when facing, in the
aggregate, more than six months in prison.4 °
This Note will explore the history of the right to a trial by jury, trace
the development of the petty offense doctrine, and discuss those cases
where aggregation of petty offenses has been allowed. This Note then
examines the holding, concurrence, and dissent in Lewis, and argues that
the Court's holding, albeit logically sound and an appropriate balance of
competing interests, could effectively subject petty offenders to prison
terms usually reserved for serious offenders. While recognizing that the
Lewis holding settles the issue of aggregation of prison terms for petty
offenses, this Note suggests that jurisprudential issues remain with respect
to the effect on the jury trial right of additional statutory penalties that
can be imposed for petty offenses. Finally, this Note proposes that aggre-
gation can be resurrected in the limited context of post-conviction ap-
peals for reduction of sentences.
35. See id. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
36. See id. at 2172-73.
37. See id. at 2171-72. The concurrence stated that this was possible because the
Court's holding would allow a prosecutor to divide a serious charge into several petty
charges. See id. After dividing the charges in that manner, the concurrence argued that
the prosecutor could then seek to imprison the defendant for longer than six months. See
id. This would allow a defendant to be sentenced to serious prison time without the pro-
tection of a jury trial. See id.; cf. People v. Estevez, 622 N.Y.S.2d 870, 876 (Crim. Ct. 1995)
(reasoning that a prosecutor could not seek to impose consecutive sentences for several
petty offenses after having reduced those charges from serious to petty offenses).
38. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
39. See id.
40. See id. at 2173-74.
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I. CREEPING TOWARD THE BRIGHT LINE: THE RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY
JURY AND THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The right to a trial by jury has deep historical roots in American juris-
prudence.4' Despite memorialization of this right in the United States
Constitution,42 there exists a long recognized limitation to this guaran-
tee.43 This limitation, created by the common law and endorsed by the
Supreme Court, seeks to balance an accused's right to be tried before an
impartial jury with the state's obligation to efficiently manage the crimi-
nal justice system.44
A. The Historical Development of the Right to a Trial by Jury
The origin of the right to a trial by jury can be traced back to England,
before the enactment of the English Declaration and Bill of Rights45 in
1688.46 Juries developed in England not only to counterbalance the sov-
ereign's power to appoint judges and prosecute offenses, but also to pre-
41. See ORDINANCE OF 1787: THE NORTHWEST TERRITORIAL GOVERNMENT art. I1
(U.S. 1787) (giving the citizens of the Ohio territory the right to a trial by jury); THE
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (charging that the English King had
"depriv[ed] [them] in many cases, of the benefits of Trial by Jury"); Duncan v. Louisiana,
391 U.S. 145, 151 (1968) (discussing the historical development of the right to a trial by
jury).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
43. See Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888) (recognizing the historical roots of
the petty offense doctrine).
44. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160. But see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983)
("fT]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and useful in facilitating
functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitu-
tion."); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 409 (Alexander Hamilton) (Buccaneer Books
1992) ("[Tlhe constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws, and that
wherever there is an evident opposition, the laws ought to give place to the constitution.").
45. 1 W. & M., sess. 2, ch. 2 (1688), reprinted in 10 HALSBURY'S STATUTES OF ENG-
LAND AND WALES 32 (4th ed. 1995) [hereinafter HALSBURY'S STATUTES]. The right to a
jury trial is affirmed in section 11 of the English Bill of Rights, which states, "[tlhat jurors
ought to be duly impannelled and returned." Id. at 34.
46. See id. Although expressly found in the English Bill of Rights, the right to a trial
by jury is also arguably found in the Magna Carta. Chapter 39 of the Magna Carta states,
"[n]o free man shall be taken, imprisoned, disseised, outlawed, banished, or in any way
destroyed, nor will We proceed against or prosecute him, except by the lawful judgment of
his peers and by the law of the land." MAGNA CARTA, ch. 39 (1215), reprinted in, A.E.
DICK HOWARD, MAGNA CARTA: TEXT AND COMMENTARY 43 (1964). Scholars, however,
have criticized the view that the right to a trial by jury originated in the Magna Carta. See
Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 922-24 (calling the contention that the trial by
jury derived from the Magna Carta, "one of the most revered of legal fables"). Still other
scholars have traced the right to a trial by jury back even further, to the reign of King
Henry II in the late 12th Century. See THOMAS Prrr TASWELL-LANGMEAD, ENGLISH CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY 71 (Philip A. Ashworth ed., 6th ed. 1992) (attributing the "Grand
Assize," or trial by jury, to the reforms of King Henry It in the late 12th century).
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vent government oppression.47 The English Colonies in America
47. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *349-
50. In modern England, a defendant has a right to a trial by jury in criminal cases where
the Crown charges the defendant by indictment. See 26 LORD HAILSHAM OF ST. MARYLE-
BONE, HALSBURY'S LAWS OF ENGLAND para. 618 (4th ed. 1979)[hereinafter HAILSHAM].
Indictments may not be sought for crimes for which courts of summary jurisdiction have
exclusive jurisdiction. See 11(2) HAILSHAM, supra, para. 914. These crimes cannot be tried
by jury. See id.; 26 HAILSHAM, supra, para. 618. For example, taking or destroying game
or rabbits by night, or entering property for that purpose is triable summarily. See Night
Poaching Act, 1828, 9 Geo. 4, ch. 69, § 1 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 HALSBURY'S STATUTES,
supra note 45, at 144-45. Wilfully and maliciously diverting or impeding the delivery of
mail is tried summarily. See Post Office Act, 1953, 1 & 2 Eliz. 2, ch. 36, § 56(1)(Eng.),
reprinted in 34 HALSBURY'S STATUTES, supra note 45, at 418. Assault on a constable or a
person assisting the constable in the course of executing his or her duties must be tried
summarily. See Police Act, 1964, ch. 48, § 51(1)(Eng.), reprinted in 33 HALSBURY'S STAT-
uTES, supra note 45, at 707. Resisting or wilfully obstructing a constable or a person help-
ing a constable in the course of executing his or her duties is also tried summarily. See id.
§ 51(3). In addition, allowing a person between the ages of four and sixteen, for whom one
has a caretaking responsibility, to reside in or frequent a brothel is tried summarily. See
Children and Young Persons Act, 1933, 23 Geo. 5, ch. 12, § 3(1)(Eng.), reprinted in 6
HALSBURY'S STATUTES, supra note 45, at 24.
There are some offenses that may be tried "either way," summarily or by indictment.
See 11(2) HAILSHAM, supra, para. 803(3). Such offenses include, among others:
(1) offences at common law of public nuisance;
(2) appearing to be the keeper of a bawdy house etc;
(6) disclosing or intercepting messages;
(7) entering into transactions intended to defraud creditors;
(9) making false returns under the Corn Returns Act of 1882;
(10) injuring works with intent to cut off electricity supply;
(11) damaging submarine cables;
(17) disclosing census information;
(18) making an untrue statement for the purposes of procuring a passport;
(23) procuring others to commit homosexual acts;
(27) committing an indecent assault upon a person, whether male or female;
(28) aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of any offence
listed in heads (1) to (27) above except head (22) above ....
Id. para. 804 (footnotes omitted).
In determining whether the offense should be tried summarily or on an indictment, a
court must consider many factors, including:
(1) the nature of the case;
(2) whether the circumstances make the offence one of serious character;
(3) whether the punishment which a magistrates' court would have power to in-
flict for it would be adequate; and
(4) any other circumstances which appear to the court to make it more suitable
for the offence to be tried in one way rather than the other, and any representa-
tions made by the prosecutor or the accused, the offence appears to the court
more suitable for summary trial or for trial on indictment
1064
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demanded this same right prior to gaining independence from England,48
and adopted it almost immediately thereafter in the Constitution.
49
Although a vast majority of the states allowed for a trial by jury in most
serious criminal offenses,5" the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a trial by
Id. para. 811. If the court determines that it is more appropriate to try the offense summa-
rily, the court must explain to the defendant the reasons for, and the potential conse-
quences of, this decision. See id. para. 812. The accused must be asked if he or she
consents to summary trial. See id. If the accused agrees to proceed summarily, he or she is
promptly tried. See id. If the accused does not consent to summary trial, the court must
then proceed to inquire whether there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused for that
offense. See id. If there is insufficient evidence to indict the defendant, the magistrate
must dismiss the charge. See id. paras. 801, 872. If there is sufficient evidence to indict the
accused, the magistrate judge must commit the accused to be tried by a jury. See id. para.
872.
A person summarily convicted of an offense triable either way can be sentenced to not
more than six months in prison or a fine of not more than £2,000, or both, unless the
statute proscribing that offense specifies a longer prison term or larger fine. See id. paras.
807, 819.
48. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 152 (discussing the First Continental Congress's demand
that the English authorities provide colonists accused of crimes the right to a trial by jury);
see also KERMIT L. HALL, ET. AL, AMERICAN LEGAL HISTORY: CASES AND MATERIALS 60-
61, 64-65 (2d ed. 1996) (discussing the demand of the English colonists to be accorded the
same rights as those persons living in England, and the demand of the First Continental
Congress that all colonists be accorded the right to a trial by jury).
The desire to have a trial by jury in the English colonies was not always observed in
practice. The Laws and Liberties of Massachusetts set forth the judicial system of the
Massachusetts colony:
That no man's life shall be taken away; no man's honor or good name shall be
stained; no man's person shall be arrested, restrained, banished, dismembered nor
any ways punished; no man shall be deprived of his wife or children; no man's
goods or estate shall be taken away from him; nor any ways damaged under color
of Law or countenance of Authority unless it be by the virtue or equity of some
express law of the County warranting the same established by a General Court &
sufficiently published; or in case of the defect of a law in any particular case by
the word of God. And in capital cases, or cases concerning dismembring or ban-
ishment according to that word to be judged by the General Court.
THE BOOK OF THE GENERAL LAVVES AND LIBERTYES CONCERNING &C, (1648), reprinted
in HALL, ET AL., supra, at 17 (setting forth a court system without expressly mentioning a
trial by jury). See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 29-
42 (1973) (suggesting that the structure of early colonial courts differed from the English
common law courts because of the necessities of colonial life and the varying structures
and citizenship of the individual colonies); Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 938-42
(discussing the propensity in colonial Massachusetts to try offenses summarily).
49. See U.S. CoNsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI.
50. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 153-54 (discussing that the original thirteen colonies all
adopted in their state constitutions the right to a jury trial, that all States guaranteed a right
to a jury trial for serious crimes, and that the right to a jury trial continued to receive
strong' egislative and public support).
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jury was not made applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment until 1968.51
B. The Petty Offense Exception
Despite explicit constitutional language guaranteeing a trial by jury in
criminal prosecutions,52 it has long been acknowledged that there is a
category of "petty" offenses to which no right to a trial by jury attaches.53
The exception to the right to a jury trial finds its source in the English
common law courts.54 Early colonial law recognized the exception, and it
continued after the United States gained independence from England.5
51. See id. at 156 (finding that the right to a trial by jury was fundamental to our
system of justice because it prevented the arbitrary exercise of official power, and, there-
fore, qualified the right for protection by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
52. See U.S. CONST. art. IlI, § 2, cl. 3; id. amend. VI. Courts have long recognized,
however, that constitutional language is not, in and of itself, the final answer to a question.
See Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 108-09 (1925) ("The language of the Constitution
cannot be interpreted safely except by reference to the common law and to British institu-
tions as they were when the instrument was framed and adopted."); Thompson v. Utah,
170 U.S. 343, 350 (1898) ("It must ... be taken that ... the words 'trial by jury' were placed
in the Constitution ... with reference to the meaning affixed to them in the law as it was in
this country and in England at the time of the adoption of that instrument.").
53. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (noting the long history of trying petty offenses with-
out a jury, and finding no substantial evidence that the Framers of the Constitution in-
tended to change this practice); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624 (1937)
(stating that the Sixth Amendment trial by jury guarantee does not apply to petty of-
fenses); District of Columbia v. Colts, 282 U.S. 63, 72 (1930) (recognizing that it was an
established principle of law that petty offenses could be tried without a jury); Schick v.
United States, 195 U.S. 65, 70 (1904) (finding it "obvious" that the Framers of the Consti-
tution intended for the exclusion of petty offenses from the jury trial guarantee); Natal v.
Louisiana, 139 U.S. 621, 624 (1891) ("[Pjetty offenses ... may be punished by summary
proceedings before a magistrate, without a trial by jury,"); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540,
555 (1888) (discussing the presence at common law of a category of offenses so minor that
they may, "under the authority of Congress," be tried without a jury); State v. Rodgers, 102
A. 433, 434 (N.J. 1917) (stating that the legislature had the power to define an offense as
petty and to make it triable without a jury).
54. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (discussing the practice in England of trying similar
offenses before a judge or magistrate only); Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624 (same); Callan, 127
U.S. at 552 (same). See generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 925-34 (discuss-
ing the general abandonment of an absolute jury trial right in England, in favor of trying
certain "petty" offenses before magistrates because of the great burden that the trial by
jury places upon the judicial system).
55. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 160 (stating that there was no evidence suggesting the
Framers of the Constitution wished to change the practice of trying petty offenses without
a jury); Clawans, 300 U.S. at 624 (noting that at the time of the enactment of the Constitu-
tion, the practice of trying petty offenses without a jury was a very common one); Callan,
127 U.S. at 552-53 (discussing American cases applying the petty offense exception). See
generally Frankfurter & Corcoran, supra note 1, at 934-65 (discussing the laws of the vari-
ous colonies and States of the United States and how they reflected their commah law
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Courts originally looked to whether an offense was indictable 56 at com-
mon law to determine if it was petty or serious for purposes of the Sixth
Amendment.57 If the offense was not indictable at common law, it was
presumed petty and could be tried without a jury.58 Over time, however,
an increasing number of criminal statutes provided for new crimes that
had no equivalents at common law,5 9 and in some cases, reduced or in-
creased the severity with which common law crimes were treated.
60
heritage with England by maintaining a class of petty offenses that were triable without a
jury).
56. An indictment is a written accusation, presented by a grand jury, charging a person
with committing a crime. See Salvail v. Sharkey, 271 A.2d 814, 817 (R.I. 1970); see also
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 772 (6th ed. 1990)[hereinafter BLACK'S]. At common law, of-
fenses that were cognizable as malum in se were required to be brought by indictment. See
Rodgers, 102 A. at 434; see also Colts, 282 U.S. at 73. Malum in se is defined as an act
being inherently evil and immoral, without respect to statutory enactment. See Grindstaff
v. State, 377 S.W.2d 921, 926 (Tenn. 1964); State v. Shedoudy, 118 P.2d 280, 286 (N.M.
1941); State v. Horton, 51 S.E. 945, 946 (N.C. 1905), BLACK'S, supra, at 959. An offense
that is malum prohibitum is a wrong that is not inherently immoral, but one that is ex-
pressly proscribed by law. See Horton, 51 S.E. at 946; see also BLACK'S, supra, at 960; 1
WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 1.6(b), at 45
(1986). At common law, offenses that were characterized as being malum prohibitum
could be charged by information. Cf. Colts, 282 U.S. at 73. An information is made by a
public officer, not a grand jury, and serves to inform the defendant of the charge against
him or her. See Salvail, 271 A.2d at 817; see also BLACK'S, supra, at 79; 2 CHARLES E.
TORCIA, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 206, at 6-9 (13th ed. 1990).
Under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, offenses for which the penalty is death,
hard labor, or a prison term of more than one year must be brought by indictment. See
FED. R. CRIM. P. 7(a). Any offense carrying a lesser penalty may be brought by either an
indictment or by information. See id. If the defendant, having been advised of the nature
of the charge and his or her rights, waives in open court the right to an indictment, an
offense that would otherwise be required to be brought by indictment may be brought by
information. See id. 7(b). An indictment or information must be "a plain, concise and
definitive written statement of the essential facts constituting the offense charged." Id.
7(c).
57. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625.
58. See id.; Schick v. United States, 195 U.S. 63, 68 (1930) (finding that the charges
before the Court were petty and could be charged by information).
59. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 625-27.
60. See id. The debate as to the common law's effect on current statutory law contin-
ues to the present time. See Day v. United States, 682 A.2d 1125 (D.C. 1996). In Day, the
defendant, having been convicted of assault, appealed the trial court's denial of a trial by
jury based on the fact that assault was tried by jury at common law. See id. at 1128. The
court of appeals rejected this argument, stating that courts would look to the common law
only to determine the seriousness of an offense in the absence of a statute. See id. at 1129
(citing Linkins v. Protestant Episcopal Cathedral Found., 187 F.2d 357, 360 (D.C. Cir.
1950)). The court found that statutes have "explicitly modified or abrogated the common
law... [which] continues to develop," and that arguments that the common law controlled
the right to a jury trial were incorrect in that such arguments did not recognize the ability
of a statute to supersede the common law. Day, 682 A.2d at 1129 (citing Linkins, 187 F.2d
at 360). It is not how society once viewed a particular offense, but how society now views
that offense, that determines whether the offense is triable by jury. See id.
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Courts, therefore, found it necessary to look to the laws and practices of
the nation for objective criteria that demonstrated the severity of a partic-
61ular crime.
In deciding whether a defendant was entitled to a trial by jury, courts
determined that the most important objective factor that demonstrates
the severity of a crime is the statutory penalty authorized by the legisla-
ture.62 Although the prescribed amount of time spent in prison was the
most important factor considered, fines and other punishments author-
ized by the legislature were also objective factors given thoughtful
consideration.63
The early cases regarding the right to a trial by jury in petty offense
cases were decided in federal jurisdictions, such as the District of Colum-
bia.64 Consequently, tension arose when the federal courts applied the
Sixth Amendment's jury trial right and the attendant petty offense excep-
tion to the states.65 In Duncan v. Louisiana,66 the defendant was con-
victed of one count of simple battery without the benefit of a trial by
jury.67 In Louisiana, simple battery carried a maximum sentence of two
years in prison.68 After determining that the right to a trial by jury was
fundamental to our system of justice,69 the Duncan Court looked to ob-
61. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 628.
62. See id.
63. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (reasoning that there
may be some cases where additional statutory penalties that are authorized for an offense
are so severe as to change the classification of an offense from petty to serious).
64. See Clawans, 300 U.S. at 623-24 (holding that a defendant charged with engaging
in the business of dealing in secondhand property without a license in the District of Co-
lumbia was not entitled to a trial by jury because the offense was petty in nature); Callan v.
Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 555 (1888) (deciding that a defendant charged with the crime of
conspiracy in the District of Columbia was entitled to a trial by jury because the offense
was serious in nature).
65. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149-50 & n.14 (1968). The tension arose
primarily out of the long running dispute as to whether the first eight amendments to the
Constitution were "incorporated" through the Fourteenth Amendment as applicable to the
states. See id. Early approaches to this conflict asked whether the right guaranteed by one
of the first eight amendments was essential to a scheme of ordered liberty. See Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The Duncan Court noted that more recent cases
had phrased the test as being whether the procedure in question was "necessary to [a]...
regime of ordered liberty." Duncan, 391 U.S. at 150 n.14.
66. 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
67. See id. at 147.
68. See id. at 146.
69. See id. at 156. It was necessary to conclude that the right to a trial by jury was
fundamental in our system of justice, as only then could the Court make that right applica-
ble to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 149-50. Whether the right
was "fundamental in our system of justice" was but one of a number of phrasings used to
describe the tests relied upon to incorporate and apply the Bill of Rights to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 403 (1965)
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jective criteria to determine whether an offense that carried a maximum
sentence of two years in prison was serious for purposes of triggering the
Sixth Amendment jury trial protection.7 °
The Court noted that federal law defined petty offenses as those crimes
punishable by no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine. 71 The
Court also recognized that forty-nine of the fifty states permitted jury
trials for individuals charged with crimes carrying more than one year in
prison, 72 and that it was common practice in late 18th century America
for individuals charged with crimes punishable by no more than six
months in prison to be denied the right to a jury trial.73 Relying on these
objective criteria, the Court held that a crime carrying a potential prison
term of two years constituted a serious offense, and therefore the severity
of the charged offense entitled the defendants to a trial by jury. 4
C. Refinement of the "Petty" and "Serious" Dividing Line
Although the existence of petty offenses was long recognized, prior to
the Duncan decision, courts had declined to draw a bright line distinction
between petty and serious offenses. 75 Soon after Duncan, however, the
(holding that the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him was "fundamental
and essential to a fair trial"); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 6 (1964) (holding that the right
against self-incrimination was "a fundamental right, essential to a fair trial"); Gideon v.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342-43 (1963) (the right to counsel is "fundamental and essential
to a fair trial"); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948) ("[The] right to reasonable notice of
[the] charge against him, and an opportunity to be heard in his defense ... [is] basic in our
system of jurisprudence."); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67 (1932) (asking whether the
right to counsel was one of "those 'fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at
the base of all our civil and political institutions'); Hebert v. Louisiana, 272 U.S. 312, 316
(1926) (stating that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
state action "be consistent with the fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie
at the base of all our civil and political institutions").
70. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 159-60 (citing District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S.
617, 628 (1937)).
71. See id. at 161. This definition relied on the old petty offense statute. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 1(3)(1964) (repealed 1987). That statute has now been repealed, and although the six
month maximum remains the dividing line for a petty offense, fines up to $5,000 are now
permissible as punishment for petty offenses committed by individuals. See 18 U.S.C. § 19
(1994); id. § 3571(b)(6)-(7). The congressional intent to make these fines correspond with
existing law so as to make them petty can be found in the legislative history of the Criminal
Fines Improvements Act of 1987. See H.R. REP. No. 100-390, at 5-6 (1987), reprinted in
1987 U.S.C.A.A.N. at 2141-42.
72. See Duncan, 391 U.S. at 161.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 161-62.
75. See id. at 160-61 (declining to hold that a six month prison sentence was the divid-
ing line between petty and serious offenses).
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Supreme Court began to define more exactingly the difference between
petty and serious offenses.76
1. Evaluation of Statutory Penalties: Greater Than Six Months
Offenses carrying more than six months in prison are defined as seri-
ous, and defendants charged with committing them have an absolute right
to a trial by jury.77 In Baldwin v. New York,78 the defendant had been
76. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996) (holding that two petty
offenses could not be aggregated to guarantee a jury trial); Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas,
489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (holding that a crime carrying no more than six months of incar-
ceration was presumptively petty); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 69 (1970) (plurality
opinion) (holding that a crime carrying more than six months in prison was a serious
offense).
77. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 69. The distinction between petty and serious crimes is
not the same as the difference between misdemeanors and felonies. See id. at 70. The
Baldwin Court traced that distinction back almost 100 years, stating that many misdemean-
ors were, in fact, considered serious by the legislature. See id. (citing Callan v. Wilson, 127
U.S. 540, 549 (1888)).
Under the current federal offense classification scheme, petty offenses can be grouped
into Class B and C misdemeanors and infractions. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(7)-(9) (1994).
Class B misdemeanors are punishable by prison sentences of more than thirty days but no
more than six months. See id. § 3559(a)(7). Class C misdemeanors are punishable by
prison sentences of more than five days but no more than thirty days. See id. § 3559(a)(8).
Infractions are punishable by no more than five days in prison. See id. § 3559(a)(9). Pro-
vided the crime does not result in death, Class B and C misdemeanors may be assessed
fines of no more than $5,000. See id. § 3571(b)(6). Infractions may be assessed fines of no
more than $5,000. See id. § 3571(b)(7). Class A misdemeanors are punishable by no less
than six months in prison but not greater than one year in prison. See id. § 3559(a)(6).
Class A misdemeanors that do not result in death are punishable by fines not greater than
$100,000. See id. § 3571(b)(5). Thus defined, Class A misdemeanors in the federal classifi-
cation scheme qualify as serious offenses under the standard promulgated in Baldwin. See
Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 70-72.
It should be noted that the states are free to define, if at all, petty offenses differently
than the federal government, so long as they do not provide punishments more severe than
those provided in the federal classification scheme. See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-
105(27) (West Supp. 1996) ("'Petty offense' means an offense for which a sentence of a fine
only is authorized."); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-10-109(1)-(2) (1986 & Supp. 1996) (defining
petty offenses as carrying no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, and providing
defendants charged with petty offenses the right to a jury trial before a jury of up to six
persons); CoLO. REV. STAT. § 18-1-107 (Supp. 1996) (dividing petty offenses into two
classes, one carrying no more than six months in prison and a $500 fine, and the other
carrying a fine only); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 54-82b(a) (West 1994) (providing no jury
trial for offenses for which the maximum penalty is a fine of $199); D.C. CODE ANN § 16-
705(b)(1) (Michie Supp. 1996) (providing no jury trial right to defendants charged with
offenses carrying less than six months in prison or a maximum fine of $1,000); FLA. STAT.
ANN. § 918.0157 (West 1996) (providing no jury trial right for offenses carrying no more
than six months in prison); 730 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/5-1-17 (West 1992) (defining a
petty offense as an offense for which fines only can be imposed); MD. CODE ANN. 4-
102(h)(1996) (defining petty offenses as carrying not more than three months in prison or a
$500 fine); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.02.4a (West Supp. 1997) (classifying petty offenses as
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tried and convicted of pickpocketing 7 9-a crime having a maximum pen-
alty of one year in prison.80
After surveying existing law, the Court in Baldwin determined that
crimes carrying more than six months in prison are considered "serious"
offenses."' The Court then noted that, in the federal judicial system, a
petty offense was punishable by no more than six months in prison and a
$500 fine.82 Upon review of state and local laws, the Court found that
only New York City allowed its courts to deny a jury trial to defendants
facing more than six months incarceration.83 The Court overruled this
practice, holding that defendants tried for offenses carrying more than six
months in prison were entitled to a trial by jury.8'
2. Evaluation of Statutory Penalties: Six Months or Less
Offenses carrying less than a six month prison term are presumed to be
petty.8 5 The presumption can be rebutted only if a defendant shows that
additional statutory penalties, when combined with the maximum prison
term, are severe enough to demonstrate that the legislature intended the
offense to be serious.86 In Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,8 7 first-time
Driving Under the Influence (DUI) offenders could receive a sentence of
no more than six months in prison, or in the alternative, forty-eight hours
offenses that are prohibited by statute but are not crimes, and that carry a sentence of no
more than $200); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1-4 (West 1995) (defining petty offenses as carrying
no more than six months in prison and "not within the Constitution of this State," and
therefore not entitled to a jury trial).
78. 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
79. See id. at 67 & n.1. The statute labeled this offense "jostling," and was New York's
attempt to deal with pickpocketers. See id. at 67 n.1.
80. See id. at 67.
81. See id. at 69.
82. See id. at 70-71 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1(3)); see also supra note 71 and accompanying
text (discussing the Duncan holding and the definition of petty offenses at the federal
level).
83. See Baldwin, 399 U.S. at 71-72.
84. See id. at 69. The Court was unable to agree on whether a defendant had a jury
trial right when charged with an offense carrying not more than six months in prison. The
plurality of Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall would have held that defendants
charged with offenses carrying less than six months in prison did not have a jury trial right.
See id. at 73. Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, concurred because they believed
Baldwin had a right to a jury trial; however, they argued that the right attached in "all
crimes" and "criminal prosecutions," and thus, that the Constitution did not fathom the
petty offense exception as the plurality would have held. See id. at 74-76 (Black and
Douglas, JJ., concurring in judgment).
85. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989).
86. See id.
87. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
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of public service dressed in clothing that identified the person as a DUI
offender.88
The Blanton Court held that, for purposes of determining whether a
defendant was entitled to a trial by jury, all crimes that carried sentences
of no greater than six months in prison were presumed to be "petty" in
nature.8 9 The Court explained that a defendant could rebut this pre-
sumption by demonstrating that additional legislative penalties, when
coupled with the maximum prison sentence, were so severe as to indicate
that the legislature viewed the crime as a serious offense. 90 In Blanton,
the Court found that the maximum six month prison sentence made the
DUI charge presumptively petty.91 The Court then evaluated the addi-
tional statutory penalties, and reasoned that the stigma associated with
the alternate sentence of having to dress as a DUI offender was not so
severe as to indicate that the legislature considered the offense as seri-
88. See id. at 539.
89. See id. at 543.
90. See id. Only statutory penalties by the legislature are considered in determining
whether the legislature viewed the offense as serious in nature. See id. at 543 n.8 (citing
Note, The Federal Constitutional Right to Trial by Jury for the Offense of Driving While
Intoxicated, 73 MINN. L. REV. 122, 149-50 (1988)).
91. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543-44.
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ous.92 The Court, therefore, held that the petitioners were not entitled to
a trial by jury."
92. See id. at 544. The maximum fine of $1,000 and mandatory 90-day suspension of
the offender's drivers license also were held to be insufficient to characterize the offense as
serious. See id. The Blanton Court made this portion of the petty offense doctrine flexible
in recognition that in some limited instances, significant statutory penalties would be at-
tached to an offense that did not carry more than six months in prison. See id. at 543.
A third-time driving while under the influence of alcohol (DWI) offender, who was eligi-
ble for a maximum of six months in prison and a mandatory 15-year suspension of his
driver's license, was entitled to a trial by jury because the penalty showed that the legisla-
ture had determined the offense to be serious. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202,
1204 (8th Cir. 1990). In Richter, Nebraska had set the penalty for a third-time DWI offense
as three to six months in prison, a mandatory 15-year suspension of the offender's driver's
license, and a $500 fine. See id. at 1203. In this case, a county court had jurisdiction to try
the offense, and that court denied the defendant a jury trial. See id. Richter was tried and
convicted as a third-time DWI offender and for refusing to take a breathalizer test. See id.
Relying on the flexibility of the petty offense doctrine set forth by the Supreme Court in
Blanton, the Eighth Circuit held that the 15-year license suspension, when combined with
the maximum prison sentence, was exactly the sort of penalty that the Blanton Court
would have considered "serious" when viewed along with the maximum prison sentence.
See id. at 1205. The court held that the deprivation of a motor vehicle license, in almost
any circumstance, would work a significant hardship on the driver. See id. at 1204. Upon
reaching this conclusion, the court held that a 15-year suspension sufficiently demonstrated
that the Nebraska legislature considered a third-time DWI offense a serious crime, and that
the defendant charged with its commission was entitled to a trial by jury. See id. at 1205.
The Richter decision is the only one of its kind, as courts have routinely upheld various
additional statutory penalties. Discretionary terms of probation that include payment of
restitution, participation in drug and alcohol dependency programs, residence at a facility
while undergoing drug and alcohol dependency counseling, weekend stays in the custody
of the Bureau of Prisons, participation or residing at a community correctional facility, and
electronic monitoring do not rebut the presumption that DUI is a petty offense. See
United States v. Nachtigal, 507 U.S. 1, 5-6 & n.* (1993). A defendant charged with a first
offense DUI was not entitled to a trial by jury when the statutory penalties included a six
month prison term, a fine of between $250 and $500, a term of probation of not more than
one year, 50 hours of community service, and enrollment in a substance abuse program at
defendant's expense. See United States v. Garner, 874 F.2d 1510, 1511-12 (11th Cir. 1989).
Defendants charged with cocaine possession were not entitled to a trial by jury when the
additional statutory penalties included eligibility for recidivist penalties and revocation of
probation imposed in a prior cocaine possession conviction. See Brown v. United States,
675 A.2d 953, 954-55 (D.C. 1996). The fact that the charge of cocaine possession was a
serious offense under federal law was not important in determining whether the local legis-
lature considered the offense to be serious or petty. See id. Additionally, civil or adminis-
trative actions that might be brought against a person charged with multiple petty offenses
did not entitle that defendant to a trial by jury. See Foote v. United States, 670 A.2d 366,
372 (D.C. 1996).
93. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 545. See generally L.S. Groff, Annotation, Right to Trial
by Jury in Criminal Prosecution for Driving While Intoxicated or Similar Offense, 16
A.L.R.3D 1373, § 3[b] (Supp. 1996) (discussing the Blanton holding).
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3. The Right to a Trial By Jury In the Absence of a Statutorily
Authorized Maximum Sentence
To determine the severity of an offense for which there is no statutory
maximum penalty, courts look to the length of the sentence imposed on a
defendant.94 If a sentence of greater than six months is imposed, the de-
fendant is entitled to a trial by jury because the length of the sentence
evidences a determination that the offense or offenses were serious in
nature. 95 In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,96 the petitioner had been tried
and convicted of seven contempts97 arising out of his criminal trial, and
94. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (allowing for jury trials in
cases where the length of the sentence actually imposed for multiple contempt of court
charges exceeded six months in prison); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (deem-
ing it unconstitutional to deny a trial by jury when the sentence imposed was two years
incarceration). But see Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974) (holding that the defend-
ant was not entitled to a jury trial where the length of the sentence actually imposed for
multiple contempt of court charges did not exceed six months in prison); Frank v. United
States, 395 U.S. 147, 151-52 (1969) (finding that a sentence of three years probation is
insufficient to merit a jury trial); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg. Co., 391 U.S. 216, 220
(1968) (holding that ten days in jail and a $50 fine was not severe enough to merit a jury
trial); Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373, 380 (1966) (holding that a sentence of six
months in prison was not severe enough to merit a trial by jury).
95. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517.
96. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
97. Contempt of court is defined in 18 U.S.C. § 401, which states:
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine or imprison-
ment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and none other, as-
(1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto as to obstruct the
administration of justice;
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official transactions;
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or
command.
18 U.S.C. § 401 (1994).
A contempt of court under § 401 is not, by definition, a crime. A contempt of court is a
crime if it meets the definition of 18 U.S.C. § 402:
Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any lawful writ,
process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district court of the United States
or any court of the District of Columbia, by doing any act or thing therein, or
thereby forbidden, if the act or thing so done be of such character as to constitute
also a criminal offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of
any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for such contempt
as provided in section 3691 of this title and shall be punished by a fine under this
title or imprisonment, or both.
Id. § 402.
Section 402 further adds, "but in no case shall the fine to be paid to the United States
exceed, in case the accused is a natural person, the sum of $1,000, nor shall such imprison-
ment exceed the term of six months." Id. This section does not apply to the contempts
specifically enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 401. See id. If the contempt committed conforms to
the definition in 18 U.S.C. § 402, however, the defendant may demand a trial by jury. See
id. § 3691. Moreover, a defendant charged with contempt of court that arises out of an
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was sentenced to six months in prison for each of the first six contempts,
and three months in prison for the seventh.98 The sentences were or-
dered to run consecutively, for a total sentence of thirty-nine months in
prison.9 9
The Court stated that because criminal contempt carries no maximum
sentence authorized by statute, it was necessary to evaluate the length of
the sentence actually imposed on the defendant in order to determine
whether he had been convicted for the equivalent of a serious offense.' 00
The Court recognized that the imposition of consecutive sentences for
contempt placed the defendant in prison for over three years.10 1 Because
this exceeded the six month demarcation line that automatically guaran-
teed a defendant a jury trial, the Court held that the petitioner had been
tried for the equivalent of a serious offense.10 2 Thus, the petitioner was
entitled to a trial by jury.
10 3
In situations where there is no statutory maximum sentence, and the
sentence imposed on the defendant is less than six months, the offense is
deemed to be petty in nature and the defendant is not entitled to a trial
by jury.10 4 In Taylor v. Hayes, °5 a lawyer was found guilty of eight
charges of contempt and sentenced to a total of six months in prison.'
0 6
injunction or restraining order issued in a case arising from a labor dispute may be entitled
to a trial by jury. See id. § 3692.
98. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 509.
99. See id. Herbert Langnes was another defendant in the same underlying trial, and
his appeal was consolidated with Codispoti's. See id. at 507. Langnes had been convicted
on six contempt charges and sentenced to 32 months in prison, although the sentence on
any one count did not exceed six months in prison. See id. at 509-10.
100. See id. at 516-17.
101. See id. at 516.
102. See id. at 517. The Court explicitly rejected the argument that because the
sentences imposed on each count were not more than six months, the defendant was not
entitled to a trial by jury. See id. The Court held that the combination of the sentences
and the decision of the trial judge to have those sentences run consecutively extended the
actual time in prison beyond that allowed for a petty offense. See id. at 516. As these
counts were effectively aggregated by the imposition of consecutive sentences, the Court
found that the defendant had been tried for the equivalent of a serious offense, thus enti-
tling him to a trial by jury. See id. at 516-17.
The Court rejected the notion, however, that a defendant would be entitled to a jury trial
if there was a "strong possibility" that the defendant would spend a substantial amount of
time in prison, regardless of the actual punishment imposed. See id. at 512.
103. See id. at 517.
104. See Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974).
105. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
106. See id. at 492-93, 495-96. The petitioner had originally been sentenced to 30 days
on the first count, 60 days on the second, three months on the third, six months each on
counts four through seven, and one year each on the last two counts, all to run consecu-
tively. See id. at 490-91. While the petitioner's appeal was pending, the trial judge entered
an amended judgment reducing the time in prison on counts seven and eight to six months
107519971
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Distinguishing Codispoti, the Court found that the petitioner in Taylor
had not been tried for the equivalent of a serious offense because the
actual sentence imposed did not exceed six months in prison. 10 7 Taylor,
therefore, substantiated the Court's reliance on whether the actual sen-
tence imposed exceeded six months imprisonment.
118
D. The Aggregation Issue
The Supreme Court cases that delineated the difference between petty
and serious offenses involved defendants charged with a single count of
one offense. 109 The cases that addressed defendants charged with multi-
ple offenses and allowed for the aggregation of the penalties, however,
arose from criminal contempt charges, for which no statutory maximum
sentence existed.'10 The disparity between these two factual scenarios
caused disagreement in the lower courts as to whether a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses was entitled to a trial by jury."'
each, and reducing the first count to a warning. See id. at 492-93. The amended judgment
was silent as to whether the sentences were to be served concurrently or consecutively, and
the Kentucky Court of Appeals and the United States Supreme Court construed this si-
lence as imposing concurrent sentences for all counts. See id. at 493, 495-96.
107. See id. at 496.
108. See id.
109. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 540 (1989) (holding one count of
driving under the influence of alcohol to be petty in nature); Baldwin v. New York, 399
U.S. 66, 67 (1970) (describing a single count of "jostling"-a crime with a maximum one
year prison term-as serious).
110. Compare Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 511, 516-17 (1974) (finding the
aggregation of the defendants' multiple charges of criminal contempt to be serious), with
Taylor, 418 U.S. at 492-93, 495-96 (denying a jury trial to a defendant convicted of eight
counts of criminal contempt where sentenced to only six months incarceration).
111. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that defend-
ants charged with multiple petty offenses arising out of the same criminal transaction could
aggregate their sentences to secure a trial by jury); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d
1512, 1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that defendants charged with multiple petty offenses
that individually do not carry more than six months in prison, but in the aggregate do carry
potentially more than six months in prison, are entitled to a trial by jury); Rife v. God-
behere, 814 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that where a judge has the discretion,
in multiple petty offense cases, to impose a sentence in excess of six months in prison by
ordering consecutive sentences, the defendant has a right to a trial by jury); United States
v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1973) (holding that defendants charged with multiple
petty offenses arising out of the same act, transaction, or occurrence were entitled to a trial
by jury when the aggregate prison term they faced was more than six months); United
States v. Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 232-33 (W.D. Va. 1988) (same); United States v.
Coleman, 664 F. Supp. 548, 549 (D.D.C. 1985) (same); United States v. O'Connor, 660 F.
Supp. 955, 956 (N.D. Ga. 1987) (same); State v. Sanchez, 786 P.2d 42, 46 (N.M. 1990)
(same).
But see United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163,
2168 (1996) (holding that defendants charged with multiple petty offenses cannot aggre-
gate the potential total prison sentence they face to secure a trial by jury); United States v.
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1. Aggregation as a Right in Multiple Petty Offense Trials
The Fourth, Ninth,11 and Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals permitted a
defendant charged with multiple petty offenses arising from the same in-
cident to aggregate the potential prison term to secure a trial by jury.
1 13
For instance, in United States v. Coppins,'14 the appellant was charged
with three different petty offenses arising from a single criminal inci-
dent. 1 5 If the defendant had been sentenced to serve consecutively the
maximum term on each of the three counts, she would have spent fifteen
months in prison.1 16 The magistrate judge, however, denied the defend-
ant's request for a trial by jury." 7 Ultimately, the defendant was con-
victed on two of the charges and sentenced to pay a fine of $170.118
The Fourth Circuit reversed the conviction, relying on the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Codispoti, which held that where consecutive
sentences for contempt of court were imposed, totaling more than six
months in prison, the defendant was entitled to a trial by jury.119 The
Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 847 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996) (same); Foote v.
United States, 670 A.2d 366, 369 (D.C. 1996) (same); Weber v. City of Fort Lauderdale,
675 So. 2d 696, 699 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (same).
See generally Romualdo P. Eclavea, Annotation, Right to Jury Trial Under Federal Con-
stitution Where Two or More Petty Offenses, Each Having Penalty of Less than 6 Months'
Imprisonment, Have Potential Aggregate Penalty in Excess of 6 Months when Tried To-
gether, 26 A.L.R. FED. 736, 736-40 (1976 & Supp. 1996) (discussing the history of the petty
offense exception, and the emerging split between courts as to whether a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses could aggregate the potential penalty faced to secure
a trial by jury).
112. See infra note 129 (discussing the aggregation approach of the Ninth Circuit in Rife
v. Godbehere).
113. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (holding that where a defendant is charged with multi-
ple petty offenses arising from the same incident, the defendant may aggregate the total
penalty faced, based on the statutory maximum sentences and the possibility of consecu-
tive sentences being imposed, to secure a trial by jury); Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1518-19
(same); Rife, 814 F.2d at 564-65 (same).
114. 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991).
115. See id. at 87. The appellant, a civilian employee at the Marine Corps Air Station at
Cherry Point, North Carolina (MCAS Cherry Point), was charged with one count of tres-
passing on a military reservation, one count of assault by beating, and one count of simple
assault. See id. Military Policemen (MPs) stopped the appellant at the gate to MCAS
Cherry Point for having an expired base vehicle decal. See id. When taken to the guard
office to receive a temporary pass, the appellant got into an altercation with two MPs,
during which she allegedly grabbed one by the shoulder and struck the other with her
purse. See id.
116. See id. at 87-88. The trespassing and assault by beating charges each carried a
maximum term of six months in prison, and the simple assault charge carried a maximum
term of three months. See id.
117. See id. at 88.
118. See id. A magistrate judge convicted Coppins for assault by beating and simple
assault, but acquitted her of the trespassing charge. See id.
119. See id. at 90 (citing Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974)).
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Coppins court adopted an objective standard of aggregation, arguing that
courts should consider the potential deprivation of a defendant's liberty
in such situations because such defendants face a potential jail term
greater than six months if consecutive sentences are imposed.120 The
court held that, for multiple petty offenses arising out the same criminal
transaction, a defendant has a right to a jury trial when the aggregate
maximum authorized prison term exceeded six months.
121
Similarly, in United States v. Bencheck,122 the Tenth Circuit adopted a
subjective approach to aggregation, allowing aggregation and trial by jury
was allowed only to the extent a defendant actually faced a potential
prison sentence of over six months. 123 The trial court in Bencheck had
tried and convicted the appellant of several petty offenses arising from a
routine traffic violation.
124
The trial court denied the defendant's request for a jury trial, promising
that the defendant would not be sentenced to more than six months in
prison regardless of whether he was convicted for any of the charges.125
After convicting the defendant on three of the charges, the trial judge
issued a sentence of concurrent terms of six months in prison for the first
two charges, and a concurrent sentence of ten days in prison on the third
120. See id. (quoting United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382 (10th Cir. 1973)). Potvin
was one of the earliest aggregation cases that involved a statutory petty offense. See
Potvin, 481 F.2d at 380. In Potvin, the appellants were convicted without a trial by jury of
two charges relating to unlawfully cutting down trees and camping in a national park. See
id. at 381. Acknowledging the competing interests of the defendants in interposing a jury
between them and the state, and those of the state in speedily and inexpensively adjudicat-
ing minor offenses, the Potvin court sided with the defendants. See id. at 382. The court
found that the offenses in question arose out of the same criminal transaction, and would
be viewed by defendants no less seriously than if they were charged with one serious of-
fense arising out of the same act. See id. The court, therefore, held that the defendants
were entitled to a jury trial because the aggregate potential sentence was more than six
months in prison. See id. at 383.
121. See Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90. The court also cited with approval a district court
opinion where the court had aggregated the potential prison term faced, and granted the
defendants a trial by jury. See id. (citing United States v. Musgrave, 695 F. Supp. 231, 232-
33 (W.D. Va. 1988)).
122. 926 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1991).
123. See id. at 1518.
124. See id. at 1513-14. The court convicted Bencheck of: "operating a motorcycle
without a windshield, face shield or goggles," "failing to obey a lawful order of a law en-
forcement officer," and "assault and battery of a police officer." See id. Prior to trial, the
court dismissed a charge of malicious injury to property, and granted a motion for judg-
ment of acquittal on a charge of operating a motor vehicle without a valid license. See id.
125. See id. at 1513.
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count.126 Ultimately, the defendant served only ten days in prison, serv-
ing the remainder of his sentence on probation.1
2 7
Relying on precedent adopting a subjective approach to aggregation,
the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed that defendants charged with multiple petty
offenses arising from the same criminal transaction are eligible for a trial
by jury, "only if he is actually threatened at the commencement of trial
with an aggregate potential penalty of greater than six months' imprison-
ment. 1 12 8 The Bencheck court upheld the defendant's conviction, finding
that he did not face such a risk because of the pre-trial commitment of
the trial judge not to impose more than six months imprisonment.'2 9
126. See id. at 1514.
127. See id.
128. Id. at 1518 (quoting Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1553 (10th Cir. 1983)).
Haar was a federal habeas corpus proceeding that involved the denial, on retrial de novo,
of a trial by jury on two petty offenses. See Haar, 708 F.2d at 1547-48. In reviewing the
appellant's petition, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that a defendant charged
with multiple petty offenses could aggregate the potential prison terms to secure a trial by
jury. See id. at 1550 (citing United States v. Potvin, 481 F.2d 380, 382-83 (10th Cir. 1973)).
The court then determined how this right should be determined: on the basis of the poten-
tial penalties faced based on the statutory definitions provided, an approach the court la-
beled "objective," or by the penalties that the defendant actually faced at the
commencement of trial, an approach the court labeled "subjective." See id. at 1552.
Reviewing the objective approach, the court noted that criminal acts from which multi-
ple petty charges might flow are categorized as serious. See id. The court also commented
that protecting defendants in such situations remained consistent with the intent of the jury
trial right to protect the defendant from government oppression. See id. Fearing that an
objective approach would significantly broaden the definition of a "serious offense," how-
ever, the court declined to adopt the objective approach, stating that such a decision was
best left to the United States Supreme Court. See id. at 1553.
The Haar court elected to apply a subjective approach when evaluating the appellant's
claim. See id. Applying the subjective standard to the appellant's case, the court noted
that New Mexico law provided that Haar would not face more prison time on retrial than
he had been sentenced to initially. See id. at 1553-54. The Haar court held that he was not
entitled to a jury trial, because he had not been sentenced to a term of imprisonment that
evidenced the commission of a serious offense. See id. See generally Stephen C. Larson,
Comment, United States v. Bencheck: Aggregate Penalties and Jury Entitlement in Multiple
Petty Offense Cases, 69 DENV. U. L. REv. 763, 773-76 (1992) (criticizing the Bencheck
decision as directly contravening the mandate of the Supreme Court in Blanton v. City of
N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989)).
129. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1520. The court found support for its holding that a trial
judge could obviate an accused's right to a jury trial by a pre-trial commitment in the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. See id. at 1519. The court reasoned that because
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(a)(3) stipulates that the rules do not apply to petty
offense prosecutions where the court stipulates that no sentence of imprisonment would be
imposed, it logically followed that the trial judge should be allowed to obviate the right to a
jury trial by stipulating a maximum prison term of no more than six months because the
trial judge would be limited by Rule 58(a)(3) to the pre-trial commitment. See id.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58 governs prosecutions for misdemeanor and other
petty offenses, as well as appeals to district court judges from trials conducted by magis-
trate judges. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(a)(1). The rules cross-reference the definition of
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2. Aggregation as Impermissible in Multiple Petty Offense
Proceedings
The Second t30 and Eleventh Circuits refused to allow defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses to aggregate the potential prison
term faced to secure a jury trial."t For instance, in United States v.
Brown,13 z the defendant was charged with two petty offenses arising from
a single incident.133 The trial judge denied the defendant's request for a
trial by jury and found him guilty on one of the counts.13 4 The trial court
sentenced Brown to three months of unsupervised probation, a fine of
$140, and a $10 special assessment.135
Reviewing Brown's challenge of the denial of a jury trial, the Eleventh
Circuit held that defendants charged with multiple petty offenses could
not aggregate the potential prison sentences they faced in order to secure
petty offenses contained in 18 U.S.C. § 19 when determining whether the rules of criminal
procedure apply to petty offense prosecutions. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(a)(3).
In a situation similar to that present in Bencheck, a court has allowed the state to remedy
the sentencing of a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses in order to effect a post
hoc obviation of the right to a trial by jury. See Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 565 (9th
Cir. 1987). In Rife, the defendant was charged with three counts of the "unlawful use of
the telephone to terrify, intimidate, annoy or harass," which is a petty offense under Ari-
zona law. See id. at 564. Initially the defendant was sentenced to one year in prison, which
after a series of appeals, was reduced to 180 days in prison. See id. Relying on Ninth
Circuit precedent, the court held' that although the appellant was entitled to a trial by jury
because he faced more than six months in prison at the time his trial commenced, the state
was allowed to remedy the denial of a trial by jury by reducing his sentence such that he
would serve no more than six months in prison. See id. at 564-65 (citing Maita v. Whitmore,
508 F.2d 143, 146 (9th Cir. 1974)); see also supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (dis-
cussing the holding in Taylor v. Hayes); infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Justice Kennedy's analysis of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(a)(3) and the
Court's holdings in Taylor and Codispoti).
130. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text (discussing the decision of the Sec-
ond Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Lewis).
131. See United States v. Brown, 71 F.3d 845, 847 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct.
2580 (1996) (holding that a defendant is only entitled to a trial by jury when he or she is
charged with a serious offense, and is not entitled to a trial by jury when charged only with
multiple petty offenses); United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 254 (2d Cir. 1995), afiJd, 116
S. Ct. 2163 (1996) (holding that the possibility of consecutive sentences for multiple petty
offenses does not entitle a defendant to a trial by jury, which is only available to defendants
charged with serious offenses, as evidenced by Congress's authorization of a sentence of
more than six months in prison).
132. 71 F.3d 845 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 2580 (1996).
133. See id. at 846. Brown was charged with one count of removal of forest products
from a national forest without authorization, and one count of parking in a restricted area.
See id.
134. See id. The magistrate judge found Brown guilty of the charge of removal of
forest products from a national forest without authorization and not guilty of the charge of




a trial by jury.'36 The court noted that the criteria to be considered man-
dated a jury trial only when the offense could be characterized as seri-
ous. 13 7 The court stated that such a characterization could be found only
in a legislative authorization of a prison term for an offense of over six
months.
138
Noting that other circuits had permitted petty offense aggregation in
similar situations, the court characterized such efforts as being "case[s]
where multiple zeros still add up to zero. ' 139 The court subsequently up-
held Brown's conviction on the grounds that defendants faced with multi-
ple petty offenses are not entitled to a trial by jury, regardless of the
potential prison term they may face through aggregation. 4 '
II. THE DEATH OF AGGREGATION: LEWIS v. UNITED StATES
In Lewis v. United States,'4' petitioner Ray Lewis, a mail handler for
the United States Post Office, was charged with two counts of obstruction
of the mails-a petty offense. 42 The magistrate judge denied Lewis's re-
quest for a jury trial and convicted him on both counts. 1 4 3 Lewis ap-
pealed to both the district court and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals,
and both courts affirmed the denial of a jury trial.'" After granting
136. See id. at 847.
137. See id.
138. See id.
139. Id. (quoting United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 92 (4th Cir. 1991)) (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting).
140. See id.
141. 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
142. See id. at 2165. Obstruction of the mails is a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1701. See 18
U.S.C. § 1701 (1994). The maximum penalty for this offense is not more than six months in
prison and a $5,000 fine. See id. § 19 (punishable by six months in prison and a fine under
section 3571(b)(6)-not more than $5,000). This places this offense of obstruction of the
mails within the statutory definition of a petty offense. See id.
143. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2165. In denying Lewis a jury trial, the magistrate judge
stated that she would not sentence the defendant to more than six months in prison if
convicted. See id. Ultimately, Lewis was sentenced to terms of three years of probation on
each count, to be served concurrently. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 253 (2d Cir.
1995), affld, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996).
144. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at 253. The opinion of the district court was unreported. See id.
The Second Circuit reasoned that, because Congress classified obstruction of the mails as a
petty offense, Lewis was not eligible for a jury trial. See id. The court stated that the trial
judge's ability to impose consecutive sentences did not automatically entitle a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses to a jury trial. See id. at 254. Evaluating the possibil-
ity of consecutive sentences, the court reasoned that because the statute authorizing con-
secutive terms of imprisonment, 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), states that multiple terms of
imprisonment are served concurrently unless ordered to run consecutively by statute or
court order, a presumption existed that multiple terms of imprisonment should be served
concurrently. See id. at 255.
1997]
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Lewis's petition for certiorari, 145 the Supreme Court affirmed the Court
of Appeals, and held that he was not entitled to a jury trial because the
mere commission of a petty offense multiple times does not render these
offenses serious.
14 6
A. The Majority Opinion: Twice "Petty" Does Not
Once "Serious" Make
Writing for the Lewis majority, Justice O'Connor stated that the defini-
tion of an offense as petty by the legislature determines whether a de-
fendant is entitled to a trial by jury.147  She reasoned that once the
legislature statutorily categorized the offense as petty, committing multi-
ple petty offenses does not make the offense serious, and thereby entitle
the defendant to a jury trial.148
Under federal law, trial judges have discretion to impose consecutive sentences on a
defendant. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994). In relevant part, the statute reads: "Multiple
terms of imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders
or the statute mandates that the terms are to run consecutively." Id. Some of the factors
to be considered in determining whether sentences should run consecutively are listed in
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a):
The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to
comply with the purposes set forth in paragraph (2) of this subsection. The court,
in determining the particular sentence to be imposed, shall consider-
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and characteris-
tics of the defendant;
(2) the need for the sentence imposed-
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote respect for the law,
and to provide just punishment for the offense;
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct;
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of the defendant; and
(D) to provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational training,
medical care, or other correctional treatment in the most effective manner;
(3) the kinds of sentences available.
Id. § 3553(a)(1)-(3); see also infra notes 174-83 and accompanying text (discussing the
threat of consecutive sentences for a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses).
Having evaluated 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), the Second Circuit argued that the presumption
of concurrent terms illustrated Congress's view that petty offenses were no different in the
aggregate than individually. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at 255. The court also noted that Lewis
could have been denied any right to a trial by jury if the government had tried the two
charges through separate informations. See id. Under such circumstances, Lewis would
have had no right to a jury trial because he would have only been charged with one petty
offense in each of the separate trials. See id.
145. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 807 (1996).
146. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
147. See id. at 2167.
148. See id. The Court noted that precedent existed at common law allowing for a trial
without a jury for a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses. See id. (citing Queen
v. Matthews, 88 Eng. Rep. 609 (Q.B. 1712); King v. Swallow, 101 Eng. Rep. 1392 (K.B.
1799)).
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Responding to Lewis's claim that Codispoti v. Pennsylvania1 49 dictated
that the potential sentences must be aggregated to secure a jury trial, Jus-
tice O'Connor stated that once the legislature determines that an offense
is petty, such determination is controlling, and that review of the poten-
tial prison sentence faced is unnecessary. 150 She reasoned that Codispoti
governed only the field of criminal contempt because of the particular
circumstances involved in such cases, and because there is often no legis-
lative determination as to the seriousness of the offense.151 In closing, the
Court noted that, had the charges Lewis faced been tried separately, he
would not have been entitled to a trial by jury, 52 and that this was fur-
ther evidence that Congress did not view petty offenses more seriously in
the aggregate. 53
B. The Concurrence: An Endorsement of a Subjective
System of Aggregation
Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Breyer, concurred in the judgment
of the Court only, determining that Lewis was properly denied a jury trial
by the magistrate judge's pretrial commitment not to sentence him to
more than six months in prison.'5 4 He reasoned that because of the trial
149. 418 U.S. 506 (1974).
150. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2167.
151. See id. at 2168. The Court stated that because criminal contempts may prevent a
judge from "maintaining the detachment necessary for fair adjudication," the guarantee of
a jury trial in those circumstances was necessary to prevent the arbitrary exercise of power.
See id.
152. See id.; United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct.
2163 (1996) (reasoning that the government could properly deny a jury trial by bringing the
charges in separate informations).
153. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
154. See id. at 2169, 2172 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Kennedy
found support for this position in the Court's holding in Taylor v. Hayes, where the peti-
tioner was found not to have been entitled to a trial by jury because he did not face more
than six months in prison. See id. at 2169; Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 496 (1974). Jus-
tice Kennedy also cited Scott v. Illinois, which held that a judge did not have to assign
counsel to a defendant charged with a misdemeanor if he made a pretrial commitment not
to impose any time in prison. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2172; Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367,
372-73 (1979). Justice Kennedy further cited Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 58(a)(2),
which allows district courts not to apply the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure in petty
offense cases where no sentence of imprisonment will be imposed because of a pretrial
commitment not to do so. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2172; FED. R. CRIM. P. 58(a)(2); see also
supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text (discussing the Taylor holding); supra note 129
(providing the Bencheck court's discussion of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
58(a)(3)).
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judge's commitment, Lewis faced no more than six months in prison-a
sentence to which no jury trial right attaches.
1 55
The concurrence then evaluated the Court's holdings in Codispoti and
Taylor v. Hayes,156 arguing that those rulings stood for the proposition
that defendants are entitled to a trial by jury when the aggregate sentence
for multiple petty offenses tried in a single proceeding would exceed six
months in prison.157 Justice Kennedy disputed the majority's limitation
of Codispoti and Taylor as only concerning those contempt offenses for
which there was no maximum sentence authorized by the legislature.'58
Justice Kennedy proclaimed that his argument rested on a fundamental
pillar of American jurisprudence: that the function of a jury is to stand
between a defendant and the state when the state seeks to deprive the
defendant of his or her liberty for a significant amount of time.'59 He
argued that such considerations are present whenever the defendant is
sentenced to a prison term of more than six months, whether it be for a
single serious offense or for multiple petty offenses.' 60
The concurrence charged that the majority's holding would permit a
clever prosecutor, who already possesses broad power to frame
charges,' 6' to obviate a defendant's right to a jury trial by dividing serious
charges into smaller, petty offenses. 162 The majority, Justice Kennedy ar-
gued, had seemingly given tacit approval to a prosecutor seeking to di-
vide a serious offense into smaller ones, as well as to deprive a defendant
of the jury trial right altogether by bringing multiple charges in separate
informations.163 In conclusion, the concurrence noted that, although the
155. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2172 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment); cf. III ABA
STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 15-1.2(a)-(b) and commentary at 16-17, 20-21 (proposing
that a defendant, entitled to a jury trial, be allowed to "waive" that right and proceed with
a bench trial upon consent of the court and the prosecutor, provided the defendant's state-
ment of waiver is made in writing or on the record in open court).
156. 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
157. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
158. See id. at 2170.
159. See id. at 2171.
160. See id.
161. See id. (citing Ball v. United States, 470 U.S. 856, 859 (1985) (acknowledging the
government's broad discretion to conduct criminal prosecutions and select the charges
brought against individual defendants)).
162. See id.
163. See id. Justice Kennedy stated a defendant would face a potentially significant
deprivation of liberty where a prosecutor might bring two charges in separate trials. See id.
A defendant in that position would be facing a significant deprivation of liberty because
sentences imposed in separate proceedings are served consecutively unless the court orders
them to run concurrently, whereas sentences imposed at the same time run concurrently
unless the court orders the sentences to run consecutively. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994).
The concurrence argued that in the case where a prosecutor would bring the charges sepa-
1084 [Vol. 46:1057
1997] Aggregation of Sentences 1085
majority correctly determined that Lewis was not entitled to a jury trial,
the rationale employed by the Court did great harm to the right to a trial
by jury.
164
C. The Dissent: Aggregation as an Absolute Right in Multiple Petty
Offense Prosecutions
In dissent, Justices Stevens, with whom Justice Ginsburg joined, agreed
with the concurrence's position that a prosecution involving possible in-
carceration in excess of six months, whether for a single or multiple of-
fenses, was sufficiently serious to confer the right to a jury trial on a
defendant.165 Justice Stevens, however, disagreed with the concurrence's
argument that the judge's pretrial commitment deprived Lewis of any
right to a jury trial, positing that the right attaches when the prosecution
commences, and cannot be avoided by a pretrial commitment. 166 The
dissent also asserted that the majority had misread the criminal contempt
cases, arguing that Codispoti stood for the proposition that when the sen-
tence imposed exceeds six months, a defendant is absolutely entitled to a
jury trial.167 Justice Stevens argued that a right to a trial by jury attaches
rately, the process would provide a defendant additional protection because the prosecu-
tor's case would be tested multiple times by different judges. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2171.
This would force the prosecutor to justify the inherently inefficient division of charges in
the course of evaluating the case. See id. at 2172. The concurrence argued that the Court's
holding, however, deprived a defendant of these protections should the multiple petty of-
fenses charged be consolidated in one trial. See id.
The concurrence also alleged that the effects of the Court's holding would have a wide-
ranging impact on the sentences imposed on criminal defendants. See id. at 2172. Survey-
ing the many regulatory offenses, Justice Kennedy argued that the Court's holding would
expose defendants charged with those offenses to years behind prison walls without the
benefit of a trial by jury. See id. Justice Kennedy stated that these regulatory offenses
were often violated discretely and, sometimes unknowingly, but that regardless, under the
Court's rationale, no person charged with them would be entitled to a trial by jury. See id.
(citing as examples: 16 U.S.C. § 707 (1994) (violations of migratory bird treaties, laws, and
regulations); 29 U.S.C. § 216 (1994) (penalties authorized for violations of the Fair Labor
Standards Act); 36 C.F.R. § 1.3 (1995) (violations of regulations of the National Park Ser-
vice); 36 C.F.R. § 261.1b (1995) (violations of prohibitions of the Forest Service); 36 C.F.R.
§ 327.25 (1995) (violations of water resource development project regulations as enforced
by the Army Corps of Engineers); and 43 C.F.R. § 8351.1-1(b) (1995) (violations of regula-
tions of the Bureau of Land Management under the National Trails System Act of 1968)).
164. See id. at 2172-73 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment).
165. See id. at 2173 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
166. See id. at 2173-74 (arguing that there is "no basis for assuming that the dishonor
associated with multiple convictions for petty offenses is less than the dishonor associated
with conviction of a single serious crime").
167. See id. at 2173.
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the moment charges are brought. 168 Because Lewis faced more than six
months in prison at that time, the dissent reasoned that he should have
been granted a trial by jury.
1 69
III. BETWEEN A ROCK AND A DEFINITION: THE PAST, PRESENT, AND
FUTURE OF THE PETTY OFFENSE EXCEPTION
The underlying problem in Lewis, although not explicitly addressed by
the majority, was how the Court should read the statute that authorizes
consecutive sentences for defendants charged with multiple petty of-
fenses.17° The Lewis Court's refusal to allow aggregation of potential
penalties by defendants charged with multiple petty offenses17 1 permits
the sentencing of that defendant to consecutive terms of imprisonment
exceeding six months.1 72 Under the majority's approach, a defendant
charged with multiple petty offenses could face a lengthy prison sentence
traditionally reserved for serious criminal convictions, 73 while the deter-
mination of his right to a jury trial is assessed as if he were accused of
only a single petty offense.' 74 Further, the Lewis Court's resolution of
the aggregation of imprisonment, combined with the Court's earlier ra-
tionale in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas,' T5 may provide incentive to
168. See id. Justice Stevens argued that this reasoning was supported by the text of the
Sixth Amendment through its reference to the right to a jury trial in all "criminal prosecu-
tions." See id.; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
169. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2174 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also III ABA STAN-
DARDS, supra note 4, at § 15-1.1 & commentary at 8 (proposing that the right to a jury trial
be guaranteed whenever a defendant faces time in prison because the jury trial right is so
fundamental to our system of justice that it should not be restricted).
170. The Second Circuit addressed this question in United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252,
254-55 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163 (1996). The Second Circuit read the language
in 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) as creating a presumption that sentences would run concurrently.
See id. at 255.
171. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168.
172. See id. (holding that defendants charged with multiple petty offenses are not enti-
tled to a trial by jury).
173. See id. But see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974) (holding that
the imposition of consecutive sentences in excess of six months for multiple petty offenses
of contemptuous conduct, tried in a single proceeding, constitutes a "serious offense" enti-
tling the defendant to a jury trial).
174. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (holding that where
the maximum prison sentence a defendant could receive is six months, the offense is pre-
sumed to be petty, and no right to a jury trial attaches, unless the defendant demonstrates
that the additional statutory penalties authorized by the legislature are so severe as to
clearly reflect the legislative intent to treat the offense as "serious").
175. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text (discussing the holding in Blanton).
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legislatures and courts to expand other statutory penalties that can be
imposed for petty offenses.176
A. The Threat of Consecutive Sentences
Contrary to the Second Circuit's interpretation of the consecutive
sentences provision of the criminal code, 77 the statute confers on the
trial judge a broad grant of discretion to impose consecutive sentences on
a defendant. 178 Although the statute provides that, "[m]ultiple terms of
imprisonment imposed at the same time run concurrently," 179 these
words are followed by, "unless the court orders or the statute mandates
that the terms are to run consecutively.'
180
Among the factors that the trial judge may consider in deciding
whether to order consecutive sentences are the nature and circumstances
of the criminal act' and "the need ... to reflect the seriousness of the
offense."' 82 Implicit, then, in the imposition of consecutive sentences
may be the court's judgment that the defendant committed a serious of-
176. Compare Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1205 (8th Cir. 1990) (arguing that
allowing a mandatory 15-year revocation of a driver's license for a third time DWI offense
to be classified as "petty" would improperly permit the state "to defeat the right to a jury
trial by keeping the prison sentence to no more than six months, while finding other severe
penalties to punish what it considers to be a serious offense"), with United States v.
Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996) (holding that
imposition of a six month prison sentence coupled with a $10,000 fine-an amount twice
the size of that allowed for a petty offense-nevertheless constituted a petty offense and
did not trigger the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
177. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163
(1996) (arguing that "the presumption under § 3584(a) is that multiple offenses prosecuted
jointly are no more serious in their aggregate than the most serious single offense of
conviction").
178. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a)(1994); see also ARTHUR W. CAMPBELL, LAW OF SENTENC-
ING § 75, at 246-48 (1978) (discussing the principle "firmly rooted in common law" that the
decision to impose consecutive sentences remains within the discretion of the sentencing
judge, and that the standard of review is whether the sentencing judge abused this
discretion).
179. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994).
180. Id. (emphasis added).
181. See id. § 3553(a)(1). This subsection also allows the history and characteristics of
the defendant to be considered as factors in imposing a sentence. See id.
182. Id. § 3553(a)(2)(A) (emphasis added). This subsection also allows the goals of
promoting respect for the law and providing just punishment for the offense to be consid-
ered as factors in imposing a sentence. See id.; cf. IV ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4,
§ 20-1.2(a), at 14 (proposing that courts reviewing sentences imposed for criminal conduct
do so with an eye to correcting a sentence that does not adequately take into account, "the
nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public
interest").
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fense, although charged only with multiple petty offenses. 183 Under the
rationale of Lewis, defendants charged with multiple petty offenses
would seemingly be exposed to serious time in prison without the inter-
position of a jury between themselves and the state.184 A trial judge,
therefore, is free to impose consecutive sentences on a defendant charged
with multiple petty offenses, and to send that defendant to prison for
more than six months without the benefit of a jury trial."s5
B. Pick Your Poison: The Inherent Unattractiveness of the Objective
and Subjective Approaches to Aggregation
Given the inherent risk to a defendant in the resolution provided by
the Lewis Court, the question arises as to whether the Court had avail-
able to it a more attractive option.186 The Supreme Court's holding in
Lewis, however, provides the most attractive of a series of unattractive
choices.
183. See Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1974) (holding that because
consecutive sentences were imposed for multiple petty offenses tried in a single proceed-
ing, the defendant "was tried for what was equivalent to a serious offense and was entitled
to a jury trial"). But see infra note 192 and accompanying text (pointing out that the theo-
retical threat of consecutive sentences has rarely materialized in sentencing).
184. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996) (holding that defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses are not entitled to a trial by jury).
185. Compare Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517 (holding that where consecutive sentences
were imposed on a defendant charged with multiple petty offenses of contempt, the de-
fendant was entitled to a trial by jury), and Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 495-96 (1974)
(holding that a defendant sentenced to concurrent terms of six months in prison was not
entitled to a trial by jury), with Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168 (holding that defendants charged
with multiple petty offenses and facing an aggregate potential term of incarceration in
excess of six months are not entitled to a trial by jury).
There has been some commentary as to how to solve this problem without resorting to
post-conviction review. See III ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 18-4.5(b) & commen-
tary at 290-91. The ABA proposes that the authority to impose consecutive sentences be
limited, in part, by the following criteria: (1) placing a ceiling on the aggregate maximum of
terms that is reasonably related to the severity of the offenses; (2) preventing the imposi-
tion of consecutive sentences until a presentencing report has been considered; and (3)
requiring an explicit finding by the sentencing court that consecutive sentences are neces-
sary to protect the public from the future criminal conduct of that defendant. See id.
186. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86, 90 (4th Cir. 1991) (holding that defend-
ants charged with multiple petty offenses arising out of the same act or criminal transaction
are entitled to a trial by jury when the potential aggregate prison term exceeds six months);
United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1518-20 (10th Cir. 1991) (noting that defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses are entitled to a trial by jury when, in the aggregate,
they are actually faced with more than six months in prison at the commencement of trial);
Rife v. Godbehere, 814 F.2d 563, 564-65 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding that the imposition of
consecutive sentences for multiple petty offenses in excess of six months imprisonment
triggers a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial).
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It is necessary to reiterate that the petty offense doctrine arose in an
effort to balance the right of the defendant charged with a petty offense
with the right of the state to expeditiously and economically administer
its judicial system. 8 7 As such, the Lewis Court chose the only option
that properly addressed these interests.
188
1. Aggregation as an Absolute Right in Multiple Petty Offense
Prosecutions: The Objective Approach
The Court's first option was to strictly read the trial judge's discretion
to impose consecutive sentences, 189 and hold that defendants charged
with multiple petty offenses have a right to a trial by jury if they face
possible incarceration in excess of six months.' To view such discretion
so broadly would, however, extend statutory interpretation to an illogical
and impractical extreme. 191 In practice, a defendant charged with multi-
187. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 543 (1989) (noting that in petty
offense prosecutions, the state's interest in speedy and inexpensive bench trial adjudica-
tions outweighs a defendant's right to a jury trial); Duncan'v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 160
(1968) (finding that concerns for efficient law enforcement and simplified judicial adminis-
tration outweigh any interest a defendant charged with a petty offense might have in as-
serting his or her right to a jury trial); District of Columbia v. Clawans, 300 U.S. 617, 624
(1937) (observing that it was a long established and accepted practice to expeditiously try
petty offenses without a jury); Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 552-53 (1888) (noting the
long established practice of permitting the summary disposition of certain minor or petty
offenses without a jury trial).
188. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2168 (holding that defendants charged with multiple petty
offenses were not entitled to a jury trial).
189. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) (1994) (providing that "[m]ultiple terms of imprisonment
imposed at the same time run concurrently unless the court orders ... that the terms are to
run consecutively" (emphasis added)).
190. Cf. Coppins, 953 F.2d at 90 (holding that when a defendant faces prosecution for
multiple petty offenses, "the maximum sentences of imprisonment authorized for those
petty offenses with which [the defendant] was charged should [be] aggregated for purposes
of determining [the defendant's] right to jury trial").
191. See United States v. Lewis, 65 F.3d 252, 255 (2d Cir. 1995), affd, 116 S. Ct. 2163
(1996) (presuming "under § 3584(a) ... that multiple offenses prosecuted jointly are no
more serious in their aggregate than the most serious single offense of conviction"); see
also CAMPBELL, supra note 178, § 76, at 249 (explaining that in many jurisdictions, there
exists a presumption that multiple sentences imposed simultaneously will run
concurrently).
Given the language of 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), it appears that use of the maxim of statutory
construction expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing is the exclu-
sion is the exclusion of another") provides the most appropriate means of reading the
statute. See In re Cash Currency Exch., Inc., 762 F.2d 542, 552 (7th Cir. 1985) (applying
this maxim of statutory interpretation in another context); Burgin v. Forbes, 169 S.W.2d
321, 325 (Ky. 1943) (same); 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATU-
TORY CONSTRUCrION, §§ 47.23-.25, at 216-17, 228, 234-35 (5th ed. 1992) (discussing the
uses and limits of this maxim of statutory interpretation); WILLIAM P. STATSKY, LEGISLA-
TIVE ANALYSIS AND DRAFTING 84 (2d ed. 1984) (same); see also BLACK'S, supra note 56,
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pie petty offenses is rarely sentenced to anything more than what a single
petty offense would authorize.192 In those rare cases where the sentence
imposed exceeds that authorized for a single petty offense, the danger
that such a sentence might be unjust is ameliorated by the availability of
appellate review.193
at 581. Applying this to 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a), it is apparent that the mention that consecu-
tive sentences will be imposed only by court order or statutory mandate creates a presump-
tion that sentences imposed at the same time will run concurrently. See Lewis, 65 F.3d at
255 (reasoning that 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) creates a presumption that sentences imposed at
the same time run concurrently).
192. See, e.g., Lewis, 65 F.3d at 253 (three years probation); Coppins, 953 F.2d at 87 (a
fine of $170); United States v. Bencheck, 926 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th Cir. 1991) (10 days in
jail, remainder of six month sentence to be served on probation); United States v. Potvin,
481 U.S. 380, 381 (10th Cir. 1973) (three months in prison); State v. Harrison, 792 P.2d 779,
780 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1990) (90 day suspension of driver's license and $448 in fines); Foote v.
United States, 670 A.2d 366, 368 (D.C. 1996) (six months in prison); State v. Burton, 540
So. 2d 1023, 1024 (La. Ct. App. 1989) ($400 in fines); State v. Gillespie, 486 So. 2d 984, 985
(La Ct. App. 1986) (one year unsupervised probation and $600 in fines); State v. Sanchez,
786 P.2d 42, 43 (N.M. 1990) (four months in prison). But see Codispoti v. Pennsylvania,
418 U.S. 506, 509 (1974) (39 months in prison).
Looking at the conduct at trial of Codispoti and his codefendant, Langnes, one can un-
derstand why their sentences were so long. The behavior of Langnes can be described as
disrespectful, rude, menacing, and somewhat bizarre, as found in the following excerpts of
the contempt charges against him:
"2. That while on trial as aforesaid on November 29, 1966, he, the defendant,
threatened to blow the trial judge's head off, by saying, 'If I have to blow your
head off, that's exactly what I'll do. I don't give a damn if its on the record or not.
If I got to use force, I will. That's what the hell I'm going to do.'
3. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 1, 1966, he, the defendant, ac-
cused and threatened the court by saying,. .. 'Now I refuse to go on with this trial
if you are going to railroad me and badger my witnesses, force me to an unfair
trial, that is exactly what I am going to do, punk. I'm going to blow your head off.
You understand that?'
Id. at 509 n.2
Langnes's comments for the trial judge primarily related to his desire to do the judge
bodily harm, however, in one charge, his comments took on a political bent:
"5. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 5, 1966, he, the defendant, made
scurrilous remarks to the court by saying, 'For the record, I would like to state
that as far as my personal opinion is concerned, communist Russia, communist
China, and Cuba need men like you. I think wherever you came from you infil-
trated the courts and the whole place might as well be communist Russia.'
6. That while on trial as aforesaid on December 9, 1966, he, the defendant,
threatened the life of the court by saying, . . . 'I won't even dignify these stinking
proceedings, punk, go to hell, and I will shake hands in hell with you. I will be
damned to you.' Also, he, the defendant, said, 'You are a dead man, stone dead.
Your Honor."'
Id. at 510 n.2
193. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204 (8th Cir. 1990) (concluding that the
severity of a mandatory 15-year revocation of the defendant's driver's license upon a third
conviction for DWI, coupled with a six month prison term, sufficiently demonstrated that
the state legislature considered the offense a serious crime); see also Jeff E. Butler, Note,
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Moreover, such an approach would unduly narrow the state's ability to
adjudicate petty offenses without a jury to only those cases charging a
single petty offense; any case where more than one petty offense was al-
leged would unequivocally guarantee the defendant the right to a jury
trial.194 The only method through which the state could deny the defend-
ant a right to a trial by jury would be to try each of the charges separately,
which would not only greatly impair judicial economy,195 but may like-
wise cause otherwise concurrent sentences to be served consecutively.' 96
A system of objective aggregation, therefore, would accord insufficient
weight to significant state interests.
197
Petty Offenses, Serious Consequences: Multiple Petty Offenses and the Sixth Amendment
Right to Jury Trial, 94 MICH. L. REV. 872, 888-89 (1995) (arguing that the amount of
prosecutorial abuse that could occur would be small under a petty offense exception that
proscribed aggregation); infra notes 237-42 and accompanying text (discussing the applica-
bility of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 in post-conviction appeals for defendants sentenced to consecu-
tive terms of imprisonment on multiple petty offenses); cf 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (1994)
(allowing a defendant to appeal a sentence "imposed for an offense for which there is no
sentencing guideline and is plainly unreasonable"). See generally LARRY W. YACKLE,
POSTCONVICrION REMEDIES § 31-34 (1981) (discussing the nature of 18 U.S.C. § 2255 as an
effective means of collaterally challenging federal convictions); IV ABA STANDARDS,
supra note 4, § 20-1.2(a), at 14 (proposing that one of the general objectives of sentence
review is to correct sentences that are excessive in length, taking into consideration the
nature of the offense, the character of the defendant, and the security of the public
interest).
194. See Haar v. Hanrahan, 708 F.2d 1547, 1552-54 (10th Cir. 1983) (discussing and
declining to adopt an objective measure of aggregated criminal penalties in determining a
defendant's right to a jury trial, because it would greatly expand the scope of "serious
offenses" to which defendants would be entitled to a jury trial); see also Bencheck, 926 F.2d
at 1515 (arguing that, were federal judges compelled to conduct a jury trial for each of the
83,092 petty offenses adjudicated in 1987, in addition to jury trials required for serious
criminal offenses, the system would face an impossible task). But see Christine E. Pardo,
Note, Multiple Petty Offenses with Serious Penalties: A Case for the Right to Trial by Jury,
23 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 895, 918-22 (1996) (arguing that a doctrine that allowed defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses to aggregate those charges to secure a trial by jury is
the only system under which a defendant's right to a trial by jury would be adequately
protected).
195. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 711 n.15 (1993) (arguing that "the Gov-
ernment must be deterred from abusive, repeated prosecutions of a single offender for
similar offenses by the sheer press of other demands upon prosecutorial and judicial
resources").
196. See 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) ("Multiple terms of imprisonment imposed at different
times run consecutively unless the court orders that the terms are to run concurrently.").
197. See III ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, § 15-1.1 & commentary, at 9 (observing
that "[t]he traditional explanation for th[e] denial of jury trial in minor offenses is that it is
justified by the public interest in prompt and inexpensive trial of petty offenses"). But see
id. at 10 ("Most states have found it possible to grant most misdemeanor defendants the
opportunity for trial by jury, and no evidence has been found that the cost has been unduly
burdensome or that significant ... delays have resulted." (emphasis added)).
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2. Be Careful What You Ask For, You Might Get More Than You
Bargained For.: The Subjective Approach to Aggregation
The Lewis Court's second option was to adopt the subjective aggrega-
tion approach endorsed by the concurrence. 198 Under this approach, a
defendant charged with multiple petty offenses could receive a jury trial
only when he or she actually faced more than six months in prison at the
outset of trial.' 99 This would permit avoidance of a trial by jury through a
trial judge's promise not to sentence the defendant to more than six
months in prison.2"'
The primary fault in this approach is that it would be difficult to admin-
ister, and potentially unfair due to a lack of criteria to be applied in mak-
ing such a stipulation. For example, suppose two defendants are charged
with an identical battery of petty offenses. In such a case, one defendant
might escape serious penalties based on a pretrial stipulation from the
first judge and receive no more than six months in prison,20' whereas, the
other defendant might be exposed to a host, of penalties, including con-
secutive sentences in excess of six months imprisonment, based solely
upon an unguided determination by the second trial judge.20 2
Without guidelines, such a broad grant of discretion is inherently sus-
pect.203 Where a judge either imposes consecutive sentences for multiple
198. See Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at 2169 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment) ("[A] defend-
ant is entitled to a jury if tried in a single proceeding for more than one petty offense when
the combined sentences will exceed six months' imprisonment ... even if each [offense] is
petty by itself.").
199. See Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1518.
200. See id. at 1519.
201. See id. at 1514. The defendant in Bencheck was sentenced to concurrent terms of
six months on two convictions and ten days for a third conviction-the latter running con-
currently with the first two sentences. See id. Having placed the defendant on probation
for the remainder of the six month concurrent sentences, the terms were imposed so the
defendant would not spend more than ten days in jail. See id.
202. Compare Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 509 (1974) (involving a defend-
ant charged with seven contempts of court and sentenced to a total of 39 months in prison,
though not sentenced to more than six months in prison on any one count), with Taylor v.
Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 490-93 (1974) (involving a trial judge who originally charged the de-
fendant with nine contempts of court and sentenced him to almost four and one-half years,
but who subsequently altered the sentence without indicating whether the new sentence
would run concurrently or consecutively).
203. None of the pretrial commitment cases discuss when, and under what circum-
stances, a trial judge may choose to obviate a defendant's jury trial right in multiple petty
offense proceedings. See United States v. Coppins, 953 F.2d 86 (4th Cir. 1991) (making no
mention of whether a judge could obviate a defendant's right to aggregate to secure a trial
by jury); Bencheck, 926 F.2d at 1519 (holding that a trial judge may obviate a defendant
accused of multiple petty offenses right to a jury trial by pretrial commitment, but failing to
identify any criteria that may be used in making that decision); Rife v. Godbehere, 814
F.2d 563, 565 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that the improper denial of a jury trial is reme-
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petty offenses tried in a single proceeding, or thwarts a defendant's right
to a jury trial by invoking a pretrial commitment to impose a sentence of
no more than six months in prison, the judge effectively supplants his own
judgment for that of the legislature. 0 4 The apparent arbitrary nature of
the subjective approach is evidenced by the fact that those courts who
adopted this approach articulated no guidelines governing such a pretrial
commitment.2 °5
Furthermore, a subjective system, though limiting the number of in-
stances where the defendant may claim a trial by jury, encourages the
state and the trial judge to thwart that right. While an offense can be
made presumptively petty if the court agrees to a maximum sentence of
six months in prison, the trial judge could subsequently impose significant
collateral consequences, such as excessive fines, that would equal a seri-
ous offense. 0 6 The flexibility of the petty offense presumption encour-
ages the state to expand the collateral consequences that can be imposed
without making the offense serious enough to warrant a jury trial. 0 7
C. The Incredible Expanding Petty Offense Fine
The Lewis decision finally settles the issue of whether a defendant
charged with one or more petty offenses can demand a jury trial on the
died when a trial judge reduces a defendant's initial sentence to a term not exceeding six
months, however, failing to furnish any guidance to lower courts in subsequently address-
ing similar decisions).
204. See Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541-42 (1989) (stating that
courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the popularly elected legislature).
205. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a) authorizes the trial judge to impose consecutive sentences, and
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A) states that one of the factors to be considered in deciding
whether to impose consecutive sentences is the seriousness of the offense. See 18 U.S.C.
§ 3584(a) (1994); id. § 3553(a)(2)(A). Thus, from the imposition of consecutive sentences,
one might infer that the defendant had, in fact, committed a serious offense. See Codispoti,
418 U.S. at 517 (holding that where consecutive sentences had been imposed totaling more
than six months imprisonment, the defendant had in fact been tried for the equivalent of a
serious offense, and was entitled to a trial by jury). But see III ABA STANDARDS, supra
note 4, § 15-1.2(a) & commentary, at 16-17, 20-21 (proposing that a defendant, entitled to a
jury trial, be allowed to "waive" that right and proceed with a bench trial upon the consent
of the court and the prosecutor, provided the defendant's statement of waiver is in writing
or on the record in open court).
206. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a
mandatory 15-year revocation of a driver's license for a third DWI conviction evidenced a
legislative determination that the offense was serious in nature).
207. Cf. United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S.
Ct. 507 (1996) (allowing Congress to impose, for a presumptively petty offense, a fine twice
the maximum amount authorized by statute for a petty offense).
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grounds of the applicable statutorily prescribed prison term.20 8 The ques-
tion remains as to whether a defendant charged with one or multiple
petty offenses can successfully claim a trial by jury based on the holding
of the Court in Blanton v. City of North Las Vegas. 209 The Blanton Court
held that a presumptively petty offense may be deemed serious if addi-
tional statutory penalties, when read in conjunction with the maximum
prison term authorized, are so severe as to demonstrate that the legisla-
ture considered the offense serious.210  This presumption has been
pierced only once, in a case where a mandatory fifteen year revocation of
a driver's license, when considered along with a maximum prison term of
six months for a third-offense DWI, was considered severe enough to
merit a trial by jury.21' The additional statutory penalties exception
found in the Blanton decision will now serve as a fertile arena for petty
offense litigation, especially since, in light of the Lewis decision, legisla-
tures and courts may have even more incentive to further push the
boundaries of an already burgeoning body of additional statutory
penalties.
An example of the current legislative and judicial incentive to expand
statutory consequences can be found in the growing range of fines for
petty offenses.2 12 The Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act
(FACE) 213 provides that a defendant found guilty of the offense of a first
time, non-violent, physical obstruction of a clinic entrance may be sen-
tenced to no more than six months in prison and a fine not to exceed
$10,000.214 Although the maximum prison sentence makes this crime
presumptively petty,21 5 the fine imposed is double the amount typically
allowed for petty offenses.21 6
208. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996) (holding that defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses were not entitled to a jury trial even though they
faced, in the aggregate, more than six months in prison).
209. See supra notes 85-93 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's de-
cision in Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538 (1989)).
210. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.
211. See Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1990); see also supra
note 92 (discussing the decision of the Eighth Circuit in Richter and the subsequent deci-
sions of other Circuits regarding this exception to the Blanton decision),
212. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2) (1994) (providing a maximum $10,000 fine for a pre-
sumptively petty offense).
213. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
214. See id. § 248(b)(2).
215. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (holding that offenses for which the maximum prison
term is six months are presumed to be petty, and that defendants charged with them are
not entitled to a jury trial unless the defendant can overcome the presumption).
216. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(6)-(7) (maximum fine of $5,000). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 19
(1994), and id. § 3571(b)(6)-(7), with id. § 248(b)(2). Federal law defines a petty offense as
"a Class B misdemeanor, a Class C misdemeanor, or an infraction, for which the maximum
Aggregation of Sentences
Nevertheless, in United States v. Soderna ,217 the Seventh Circuit held
that the $10,000 fine provision in FACE did not render the offense seri-
ous.218 The Soderna court reasoned that because Blanton v. City of North
fine is no greater than the amount set forth for such an offense in section 3571(b)(6) or (7)
in the case of an individual." Id. § 19 (emphasis added). Class B or C misdemeanors, and
infractions, that do not result in death, are punishable by a fine of not greater than $5,000.
See id. § 3571(b)(6)-(7).
The legislative history of FACE is silent as to why the penalty for a first offense non-
violent obstruction was set at six months in prison and a $10,000 fine. See H.R. CoNF. REP.
No. 103-488, at 9 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 724, 726. The House version of
the Act did not contain a provision for non-violent obstruction, while the Senate version
did provide for such an offense. See id. At conference, it was decided that with respect to
this issue, the Senate version should be enacted. See id. The only mention of fines was
that the level might have to be reconsidered at a later date if "the passage of time ha[d]
rendered these statutory amounts obsolete." Id.
This silence is not explained by referencing other federal civil rights laws, upon which
the prohibited activities section of FACE was "closely modeled." See id. at 8 (stating that
FACE had been "closely modeled on federal civil rights laws" (including 18 U.S.C.
§ 245(b), 42 U.S.C. § 3631, 18 U.S.C. § 247)). Under 18 U.S.C. § 245(b), it is unlawful to
"injure [ ], intimidate [ ], or interfere [ ] with, or attempt to injure, intimidate, or interfere
with" federally protected activities such as voting, enrolling, or attending a public school or
college, and "enjoying any benefit, service, privilege, program, facility, or activity provided
or administered by the United States." See 18 U.S.C. § 245(b) (1994). A person violating
this section shall be imprisoned for not more than one year or fined in accordance with
Title 18. See id. The maximum prison term of one year categorizes the offense as serious.
See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66, 72-73 (1970) (holding that offenses that carry
greater than six months in prison are "serious" and defendants charged with them are
entitled to a trial by jury). Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 247(b) imposes a prison term of not more
than one year and a fine under Title 18 for anyone who intentionally obstructs an individ-
ual from the free exercise of religious beliefs. See 18 U.S.C. § 247(b)-(c). Section 3631 of
Title 42 prevents similar activity relating to intimidation in cases arising under the Fair
Housing laws. See 42 U.S.C. § 3631(a)-(c) (1994). The minimum penalty under this sec-
tion is not more than one year in prison and a fine under Title 42. See id. In all three
cases, the maximum prison term of one year makes the offense "serious" as it is a Class A
misdemeanor. See 18 U.S.C. § 3559(a)(6) (1994). The maximum fine for a Class A misde-
meanor that does not result in death is $100,000. See id. § 3571(b)(5). The House version
of FACE, therefore, was modeled on the three civil rights statutes above. See H.R. CoNF.
REP. No. 103-488, at 8 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.A.A.N. 724, 725. The non-violent
obstruction provision of FACE and the penalties imposed for its first offense, however, do
not have similar counterparts in those acts. See id. at 9.
The legal impact of FACE ranges far beyond this portion of its penalty provisions, and a
complete analysis of this Act is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally Kristine L.
Sendek, Comment, "FACE"-ing The Constitution: The Battle Over the Freedom of Access
to Clinic Entrances Shifts From Reproductive Health Facilities to the Federal Courts, 46
CATH. U. L. REV. 165, 196-203, 223-39 (1996) (arguing that FACE withstands challenges
on First Amendment, vagueness, overb'readth, and Commerce Clause grounds).
217. 82 F.3d 1370 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996).
218. See id. at 1379. This Note does not assert that Congress cannot impose a fine of
greater than $5,000 for a Class B or C misdemeanor or infraction. The language of 18
U.S.C. § 3571 clearly allows Congress to impose a fine greater than that specifically enu-
merated for these classes of offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 3571(b)(1) (a defendant may be
fined "the amount specified in the law setting forth the offense"). This Note does, how-
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Las Vegas219 held that an offense that carried a maximum prison sentence
of not more than six months was presumptively petty,22° it would be rare
when this presumption could be overcome.221 The proof necessary to do
so would have to "clearly reflect a legislative determination that the of-
fense in question [was] a 'serious' one., 222 The Soderna court held that a
fine above that authorized by federal law for a petty offense does not
necessarily overcome this presumption, and that the defendants were not
entitled to a trial by jury.223 Chief Judge Posner, writing for the court,
ever, assert that by defining a petty offense in 18 U.S.C. § 19 as, in the case of an individ-
ual, meriting a fine "no greater than the amount set forth ... in section 3571(b)(6) or (7),"
Congress has preserved the jury trial right for any defendant charged with a Class B or C
misdemeanor, or an infraction that carries a fine of greater than $5,000, the amount set
forth in section 3571(b)(6)-(7). See id. § 19; id. § 3571(b)(6)-(7).
219. 489 U.S. 538 (1989).
220. See id. at 543.
221. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1378-79; see also Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (reasoning that a
presumptively petty offense may be serious if additional statutory penalties are so severe
that they demonstrate that the legislature considered the offense serious).
222. Soderna, at 1378 (citing Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543). See generally John F. Gillespie,
Annotation, Right to Jury Trial for Offense Punishable by Fine Exceeding $500 as Affected
by Definition of Petty Offenses in 18 U.S.C.S. § 1(3), 40 A.L.R. FED. 876, 876-82 (1978 &
Supp. 1996) (discussing the rationale employed by courts that had addressed the problem
of whether to allow for a trial by jury in cases where a petty offense carried a fine greater
than the $500 maximum fine allowed by statute for such offenses).
223. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1379. Among the justifications Judge Posner presented in
the decision was that 18 U.S.C. § 3571(c)(6) provided for fines of up to $10,000 for organi-
zations convicted of Class B or C misdemeanors. See id. Judge Posner reasoned that,
"when we reflect that many individuals have more money than many organizations," a
$10,000 fine on an individual was not severe enough to merit a trial by jury. Id.
Judge Posner rested this reasoning on the Supreme Court decision in Muniz v. Hoffman,
422 U.S. 454 (1975). See id. In Muniz, a labor union received a $10,000 fine for violating
picketing injunctions. See id. at 456-58. The fine was imposed without a trial by jury. See
id. at 457. The Muniz Court found no intention on the part of Congress to give unions the
right to a trial by jury in actions arising from labor disputes. See id. at 462-72. The major-
ity also held that the $10,000 fine, which was $9,500 more than the amount that could be
imposed for a petty offense at the time, did not make the offense serious and thus entitle
the union to a jury trial. See id. at 477.
Despite the Muniz holding and Judge Posner's reliance upon it in Soderna, it must be
noted that a fine of $10,000 is the maximum fine that can be imposed on an organization
for a Class B misdemeanor-a petty offense. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571(c)(6) (1994). So,
although the Muniz Court stated that the statutory fine should not be given "talismanic
significance," it appears that the fine has been codified. See Muniz, 422 U.S. at 477. Com-
pare id., with 18 U.S.C. § 19 (1994) (stating that for a petty offense, a fine can be imposed
which is, "no greater than the amount set forth ... in section 3571(b)(6) or (7) in the case of
an individual" (emphasis added)). Cf III ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 18-




noted that, when inflation was taken into account, the maximum fine in
FACE was not severe enough to entitle the defendant to a trial by jury.224
Based upon simple mathematical analysis, however, questions arise as
to whether Judge Posner's mention of inflation assists in the evaluation of
this offense.225 Measuring the rate of inflation from the years 1988-1994
using the Consumer Price Index,226 and calculating how the rate of infla-
tion has devalued both the fine in Soderna227 and the maximum amount
that 18 U.S.C. § 19 imposes for a petty offense, 2 s the Soderna fine is
devalued by inflation to a cost of $7,982.46,29 while the petty offense fine
is devalued to a cost of $3,991.23.230 When inflation is accounted for, as
Judge Posner suggested, the Soderna fine is still twice as large as ex-
pressly allowed by Congress for petty offenses.2 31 Even if it is stipulated
that the petty offense fine is not affected by inflation, and retains its real
value of $5,000, the nominal fine under FACE, which must be devalued to
real (1988) dollars, is still almost sixty percent greater than the petty of-
fense fine.
232
224. See Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1378-79. Judge Posner used Blanton as a benchmark
because that decision established that a presumptively petty offense may become serious if
the additional statutory penalties are severe. See id. at 1378; Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543; see
also Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202, 1204-05 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding that a mandatory
15-year revocation of a driver's license for a third-time DWI conviction was sufficiently
severe, making the offense serious).
225. See infra app. at Equations 1-6.
226. See infra app. The CPI is a widely used, albeit imperfect, measure of the rate of
inflation in the United States. See THOMAS H. WONNACOTT & RONALD J. WONNACOIrT,
INTRODUCTORY STATISTICS FOR BUSINESS AND ECONOMICS, § 22-3(B) at 673-74 (4th ed.
1990) (discussing the various difficulties and shortcomings of the CPI in measuring infla-
tion and prices); see also ADVISORY COMM'N TO STUDY THE CONSUMER PRICE INDEX,
SENATE FINANCE COMM., 104TH CONG., TOWARD A MORE ACCURATE MEASURE OF THE
COST OF LIVING 20-64 (Comm. Print 1996)[hereinafter BOSKIN COMMISSION REPORT] (de-
tailing the various biases and shortcomings of the CPI).
In applying the CPI to this situation, the most pressing concern is that the comparison
being made is between consumer goods and criminal offenses. This would necessitate the
assumption that a criminal balances the cost of crime with the cost of such basic items as
milk and eggs. Complete accuracy would demand the creation of a measure by which to
calculate the average criminal fine and the number of times a particular crime is commit-
ted, i.e. a "Criminal Consumer Price Index." While that task is beyond the scope of this
Note, it is nevertheless possible to demonstrate inflationary trends using existing indices.
See infra app.
227. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2) (1994) (maximum fine of $10,000).
228. See id. §§ 19, 3571(b)(6)-(7) (maximum fine of $5,000).
229. See infra app., at Equation 3.
230. See infra app., at Equation 4.
231. See infra app., at Equations 3-4.
232. See infra app., at Equation 3 & note 254 and accompanying text.
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The decision in Soderna gives the courts and Congress a license to
freely ignore statutory definitions,2 33 and legitimizes legislative and judi-
cial efforts234 to expand the statutory penalties that may be imposed for
petty offenses without permitting those defendants a jury trial.235 Specifi-
233. See United States v. Kozel, 908 F.2d 205, 207 (7th Cir. 1990) (arguing that the
purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 19 was to place a ceiling of six months in prison and a maximum
fine of $5,000 for petty offenses). Compare United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378-
79 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct. 507 (1996) (reasoning that the statutory definition of
petty offenses does not control whether a defendant charged with a petty offense has a
constitutional right to a trial by jury), and United States v. Unterburger, 97 F.3d 1413,
1415-16 (11th Cir. 1996) (stating that it was the maximum prison term that a defendant
faced that determined a trial by jury right, and not the maximum fine that could be im-
posed under FACE), with United States v. McAlister, 630 F.2d 772, 774 (10th Cir. 1980)
(holding that where a defendant was charged with an offense carrying a fine greater than
the statutory definition of a petty offense, the defendant was entitled to a jury trial), and
United States v. Lucero, 895 F. Supp. 1419, 1420 (D. Kan. 1995) (holding that because the
maximum fine under FACE exceeded the statutory definition of a petty offense, the de-
fendant was entitled to a trial by jury). See generally III ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4,
at § 18-2.7(b) (proposing that the decision whether to impose a fine, "up to the authorized
maximum," should remain at the discretion of the sentencing judge).
234. On its face, 18 U.S.C § 19 is absolutely unambiguous and clear. See 18 U.S.C. § 19
(1994). When statutory language is clear, it will normally be conclusive. See United States
v. Clark, 454 U.S. 555, 560 (1982); see also 2A SINGER, supra note 191, at § 46.04, at 98-99
(discussing the doctrine that courts are required to give effect to statutory language when
that language is "clear and unambiguous"); id. § 46.06, at 119-20 (stating that it is a basic
rule of statutory construction that no part of a statute will be interpreted so that another
part will be inoperative). But see KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DE-
CIDING APPEALS 521-35 (1960) (arguing that for every canon of statutory construction that
one might bring to bear on a point there is an equal and opposite canon); RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 276-77 (1985)("A realistic under-
standing of legislation is devastating to the canons of construction ... [in that] with a few
exceptions, they have no value even as flexible guideposts or rebuttable presumptions...
because they rest on wholly unrealistic conceptions of the legislative process."). See gener-
ally Richard A. Posner, Statutory Interpretation-In the Classroom and In the Courtroom,
50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 811-17 (1983) (providing a more complete explanation' of Judge
Posner's views on the inefficiency of the canons of statutory construction). Judge Posner's
opinion in Soderna takes that clear language and creates ambiguity, thus allowing the
judge to substitute his opinion for that of the legislature. Compare Soderna, 82 F.3d at
1378-79 (holding that a fine in excess of the statutory maximum for a petty offense did not
make that offense serious), with Blanton v. City of N. Las Vegas, 489 U.S. 538, 541 (1989)
(stating that the courts should not substitute their judgment for that of the legislature), and
Lake Cumberland Trust v. E.P.A., 954 F.2d 1218, 1222 (6th Cir. 1992) (stating that it is an
accepted canon of construction that no part of a statute will be interpreted so as to render
another part of the statute inoperative).
235. Cf Soderna, 82 F.3d at 1378-79 (holding that the presumption that an offense was
petty was not overcome by authorization of a fine twice the amount that Congress had
defined as being the maximum fine that could be imposed for a petty offense). The only
federal case where this presumption was overcome was Richter v. Fairbanks, 903 F.2d 1202
(8th Cir. 1990). Richter, a federal habeas corpus proceeding, held that a mandatory 15-
year revocation of a driver's license for a third conviction for driving under the influence of
alcohol was sufficiently severe. See id. at 1204-05. The court found that when coupled with
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cally, there is nothing to prevent a court, with statutory approval, from
imposing fines greater than the $5,000 petty offense maximum on defend-
ants convicted of single or multiple petty offenses while denying those
defendants a trial by jury.236 Combined with the deprivation of liberty
posed by the threat of consecutive sentences, Soderna threatens a petty
offense defendant with potentially grave economic loss.2 37
D. Last Gasp or Resurrection?
The Court in Blanton stated that there would be certain cases where
additional statutory penalties, coupled with the maximum authorized
prison term, would demonstrate that a legislature determined that offense
to be. serious.2 38 This exception could be applied in post-conviction ap-
peals when consecutive sentences were imposed for multiple petty of-
fense convictions.239
the maximum prison term authorized, the presumption that the offense was petty was over-
come, and that the legislature had, in fact, considered the offense serious. See id.
236. See Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2168 (1996) (holding that defendants
charged with multiple petty offenses were not entitled to aggregate the potential prison
term faced in order to secure a trial by jury).
237. But see III ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 18-2.7(c)(i) (proposing that the
sentencing court should consider the financial means of the defendant, while respecting the
other financial obligations of the defendant, when deciding whether to impose a fine and
for what amount).
238. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543.
239. It must be noted at the outset that there is no constitutional right to appeal. See
McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894). The right to appeal in criminal cases is
"purely a creature of statute." Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 656 (1977). Appel-
late review of criminal sentencing in the federal judicial system is provided through 18
U.S.C. § 3742 (1994). A defendant may appeal his or her sentence by alleging that it "was
imposed in violation of the law; ... was imposed as a result of an incorrect application of
the sentencing guidelines; ... is greater than the sentence specified in the applicable guide-
line range; . . . , [or] was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline
and is plainly unreasonable." Id. § 3742(a)(1)-(4); see also United States v. Giddings, 37
F.3d 1091, 1093 (5th Cir. 1994) (listing the criteria which would, under 18 U.S.C. § 3742,
merit vacating a sentence); United States v. Headrick, 963 F.2d 777, 779 (5th Cir. 1992)
(same); United States v. Gabay, 923 F.2d 1536, 1544 (11th Cir. 1991) (same).
As petty offenses are Class B and C misdemeanors or infractions, the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines are not applicable to them. See 18 U.S.C. § 19 (defining petty offenses as Class
B or C misdemeanors or infractions); UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMMISSION, FED-
ERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 10 (1995) ("[T]he guidelines will apply to more
than 90 percent of all felony and Class A misdemeanor cases in the federal courts."); see
also Cheryl G. Bader & David S. Douglas, Where to Draw the, Guideline: Factoring the
Fruits of Illegal Searches into Sentencing Guidelines Calculations, 7 TOURO L. REV. 1, 1 n.1
(1990) (noting that petty offenses are not covered by the federal sentencing guidelines).
This leaves the defendant who is sentenced to consecutive terms on multiple petty offenses
the option of appealing on the grounds that either the sentence was imposed in violation of
the law, or was imposed for an offense for which there is no sentencing guideline and is
plainly unreasonable. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(1),(4).
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Reading the authorization of consecutive sentences contained in the
criminal code along with the prescribed sentence for any criminal offense,
it might be argued that the imposition of consecutive sentences is an addi-
tional statutory penalty.24° Thus, imposition of consecutive sentences in a
multiple petty offense proceeding could trigger appellate review 241 to de-
termine whether the imposition of consecutive sentences showed that the
defendant had been tried for the equivalent of a serious offense.242
There is nothing in Lewis that explicitly rejects an approach that would
allow a defendant convicted of multiple petty offenses, and sentenced to
consecutive terms in prison, to show on post-conviction appeal that he or
The record for review consists of "(1) that portion of the record in the case that is desig-
nated as pertinent by either of the parties; (2) the presentence report; and (3) the informa-
tion submitted during the sentencing proceeding." Id. § 3742(d)(1)-(3). In determining
whether the sentence was imposed in violation of law or was plainly unreasonable, "[t]he
court of appeals shall give due regard to the opportunity of the district court to judge the
credibility of witnesses, and shall accept the findings of fact of the district court unless they
are clearly erroneous." Id. § 3742(e). If the court of appeals determines that the sentence
was plainly unreasonable and determines the sentence to be too high, it shall set the sen-
tence aside and remand the case for resentencing. See id. § 3742(f)(2)(A). Upon remand,
the district court will correct the sentence in accord with the findings of the court of ap-
peals. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(a)(1).
Research for this Note has produced no cases involving a petty offense prosecution and a
subsequent appeal on the basis that the sentence imposed was plainly unreasonable. There
is case law that involves the "plainly unreasonable" standard, but it involves cases where,
although there was no sentencing guideline, there did exist policy in the federal sentencing
guidelines upon which review for a "plainly unreasonable" sentence could be based. See
Giddings, 37 F.3d at 1097 (holding that a sentence imposed was not plainly unreasonable if
in accord with a similar, mandatory guideline in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines);
Headrick, 963 F.2d at 782-83 (same). It does seem reasonable to infer, however, that a
sentence similar to that imposed in Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), would
qualify for the "plainly unreasonable" standard in 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4). Compare 18
U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (setting forth the "plainly unreasonable" standard for review of
sentences not subject to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines), with Codispoti, 418 U.S. at
516-17 (holding that defendant sentenced to 39 months in prison on multiple petty offenses
was entitled to a trial by jury). It is apparent from both the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3742 and
Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure that any remand on these grounds
would be for resentencing, and not for retrial. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(f)(2)(A) (stating that
the court of appeals would remand for "sentencing proceedings"); FED. R. CRIM. P.
35(a)(1) (resentencing of defendant in accordance with a remand pursuant to 18 U.S.C.
§ 3742(f)(2)(A)).
240. See Blanton, 489 U.S. at 543 (reasoning that there may be additional statutory
penalties that, when combined with the maximum authorized period of imprisonment,
clearly show that the defendant had been tried for what the legislature considered a serious
offense).
241. See IV ABA STANDARDS, supra note 4, at § 22-5.3(b) & commentary at 61 (pro-
posing that appellate courts exercise a broad scope of review "so that all pertinent legal
issues are considered on their merits," and not on formalities).
242. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517 (holding that a defendant, though not sentenced to
more than six months imprisonment on any individual charge, had been convicted of the
equivalent of a serious offense because consecutive sentences were imposed).
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she had been tried for the equivalent of a serious offense because the
sentence imposed was "plainly unreasonable. ' 43 As Codispoti was not
explicitly overruled, a defendant sentenced to consecutive terms of im-
prisonment exceeding six months may argue that the imposition of con-
secutive sentences, read in conjunction with the maximum prison term
authorized for the crime, demonstrates that the defendant was tried for
the equivalent of a serious offense. 244 As such, the appellant was origi-
nally entitled to a trial by jury, and is now entitled to, at the minimum, a
remand for resentencing on more reasonable grounds.
2 45
IV. CONCLUSION
The Lewis Court chose a bright line test- that sets a high standard in
determining if a defendant charged with a petty offense may receive a
trial by jury. The Court's holding exposes defendants charged with multi-
ple petty offenses to prison sentences normally reserved for defendants
convicted of serious offenses. The strong interest of the state in prosecut-
ing petty offenses efficiently and economically, however, outweighed the
right of the defendant to a trial by jury. Although this decision may en-
tice legislatures to impose greater fines for petty offenses, such fines ar-
guably may be additional statutory penalties so severe as to elevate the
petty offense to the equivalent of a serious offense. While this option
provides little pretrial comfort to the defendant charged with multiple
243. See 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a)(4) (allowing a defendant to appeal a sentence for an of-
fense with no applicable sentencing guideline, alleging that it was "plainly unreasonable");
cf. Lewis v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 2163, 2167 (1996) (holding that aggregation of multi-
ple petty offenses was impermissible in determining whether a defendant was entitled to a
trial by jury, however, failing to state how a defendant sentenced to consecutive terms of
imprisonment exceeding six months on multiple petty offenses could appeal what would
normally be the equivalent of a serious offense).
244. See Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517.
245. The Court in Lewis stated that, where the legislature had determined that an of-
fense was petty, the Court did not "look to the potential prison term faced by a particular
defendant who is charged with more than one such petty offense." Lewis, 116 S. Ct. at
2167. (first emphasis added). The words "potential prison term" provide the view of the
court before trial. There is nothing in the language of the Court's holding that shows a
desire to entirely cut off post-conviction review of sentences imposed on defendants con-
victed of multiple petty offenses. Cf. id. Indeed, the Lewis Court reaffirmed the value of a
jury trial in preventing arbitrary exercises of official power. See id. An example of an
arbitrary exercise of official power is the imposition of consecutive sentences for multiple
petty offenses. Cf. Codispoti, 418 U.S. at 517 (discussing why the imposition of consecutive
sentences, in the context of a trial for multiple criminal contempts of court, may be an
abuse and arbitrary use of official power, and therefore require a jury trial).
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petty offenses, it does at least provide post-conviction hope to set right
any potential wrong incurred because of the denial of a trial by a jury.
Andrew James McFarland
MATHEMATICAL APPENDIX
It is possible to analyze mathematically Judge Posner's suggestion that
the rate of inflation does not clearly render "serious" the maximum fine
that can be imposed under FACE.
A. Consumer Price Index Analysis
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) is used to measure the rate of infla-
tion and compare prices over time.246 The CPI is the aggregate price of a
large basket of goods purchased by an average consumer at a particular
time.247 Changes in this figure over time indicate inflationary changes in
prices.48 The CPI takes on particular usefulness when it is used to mea-
sure the "real price" or "constant dollar" cost of a particular good.249
Because inflation increases the current cost of a good, often called the
"nominal price" or "current dollar" cost, measuring the change in the
CPI from a stated base year through the present year can give us the real
price of that good, as it would cost in the base year.2  If the real price of
a good is greater than its current dollar price, its cost has risen above the
rate of inflation.251 Likewise, if the real price is less than its current dol-
lar price, its cost has fallen relative to inflation. 252 The real price (RP) is
calculated by dividing the CPI for the base year (X) by the CPI for the
current year (Y), and multiplying it by the current dollar price (CDP) of
that good.253 The equation is thus stated as:
CPI(X) x CDP = RP [Equation 1]
CPI(Y)
We can posit that the current dollar price of committing a first time,
non-violent, obstruction of a clinic entrance is $10,000.254 In Soderna,
Judge Posner suggested that the base year for inflation should be 1989,
246. See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS § 1.5 at 13-
14 (2d ed. 1992).







254. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b) (1994).
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the year of the Blanton decision.255 The CPI for 1989 was 124.0.256 So let
CPI(X) equal 124.0. The CPI for 1996 is currently unavailable, however,
it has been calculated for 1994-the year FACE was enacted. The CPI
for 1994 was 148.2.257 So let CPI(Y) equal 148.2. With that, the equation
can be stated as:
124.0 x $10,000 = $8,367.07 [Equation 2]
148.2
Stated in terms of the value of the dollar in 1989, the fine that can be
imposed today for a first time non-violent obstruction of a clinic entrance
is $8,367.07. A fine of $5,000 could have been imposed for a petty offense
in 1989.258 This means that in 1989, the dollar amount of a fine that theo-
retically could have been imposed had FACE been in effect at that time
($8,367.07) would have exceeded the maximum petty offense fine that
could have been imposed by statute by $3,367.07, an amount greater than
sixty percent.
Continuing this mathematical analysis, it would be helpful to compare
the fine that can be imposed under FACE with the maximum statutory
petty offense fine from the date that the statutory maximum fine was au-
thorized. Such a comparison would assist in understanding Judge Pos-
ner's suggestion that inflation demonstrated that the fine imposed under
FACE was not clearly severe because it would demonstrate the real val-
ues of both fines.
The maximum fine imposed for a petty offense was increased from
$500 to $5,000 in 1988.259 The CPI was 118.3 in 1988, and was 148.2 in
1994, the year FACE was enacted. 260 Accordingly, CPI(X) will equal
118.3, and CPI(Y) will equal 148.2. Again, the CDP will be the fine of
$10,000. This allows for the following equation:
118.311. x $10,000 = $7,982.46 [Equation 3]
148.2
255. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
507 (1996).
256. See DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES 1995 492, tbl. 761 (115th ed. 1995)[hereinafter STATISTICAL ABSTRACT]. The CPI
uses a base year, 1983-1984, where the CPI is equal to 100, in order to provide consistency
in comparisons over the time period 1960-1995. See id. CPI-U, the CPI for all urban con-
sumers (approximately 80%), is used for these equations. See id. at 489.
257. See id.
258. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571(b)(6)-(7).
259. See Criminal Fines Improvements Act, Pub. L. 100-185 § 6, 101 Stat. 1280 (1987)
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3571).
260. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT supra note 256, at 492, tbl. 761.
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Thus the fine imposed under FACE, had it been in effect in 1988, was
$7,982.46. As stated above, the maximum fine that could be imposed for
a petty offense in 1988 was $5,000.261 Therefore, the fine in real dollars
(1988) that could be imposed under FACE was $2,982.46 higher than the
statutory maximum fine that could be imposed for petty offenses at that
time, an amount almost 60% greater than the maximum petty offense
fine.
Moreover, it cannot be assumed that inflation devalues the fine im-
posed under FACE without devaluing the fine to which we are comparing
it to-the maximum statutory petty offense fine. That fine can be deval-
ued over the same time period and compare it against the devalued cost
of the maximum fine under FACE. We can assume that the current dol-
lar price of a petty offense is $5,000.262 Moreover, the base year for any
calculation will be 1988-the year that the fine was increased to $5,000.263
The CPI for 1988 was 118.3.264 This allows CPI(X) to equal 118.3. TheCPI for 1994 was 148.2.265 This allows CPI(Y) to equal 148.2. The equa-
tion is thus:
118.3 x $5,000 = $3,991.23 [Equation 4]
148.2
So, in real dollars (1988), the cost of a petty offense was just over
$1,000 less than was authorized by statute. Comparing it to the real price
of the FACE fine in 1988 dollars, ($7.982.46), the equations above
demonstrate that the FACE fine is still twice as large as the maximum
petty offense fine.266
The calculations above demonstrate that inflation has not devalued the
$10,000 FACE fine to such an extent as to keep it equal to the maximum
statutory fine that can be imposed for petty offenses. If the petty offense
fine is not devalued by inflation, the FACE fine would impose a fine ap-
proximately 60% greater than the statutory maximum. By devaluing the
petty offense fine over the same period, the equations above demonstrate
that the FACE fine remains twice as large as what Congress defines as
being a permissible fine for a petty offense. In Soderna, Judge Posner
reasoned that an offense was not made "serious" simply because the fine,
261. See Criminal Fines Improvements Act § 6.
262. See id.
263. See id.
264. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 492, tbl. 761.
265. See id.
266. See supra app., at Equations 3-4.
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as demonstrated, was greater than the statutory petty offense fine.26 7 The
calculations show that, even after taking inflation into account, the FACE
fine is greater than that fine presently allowed by Congress for a petty
offense.268
It should be noted that, under this reasoning, the fine that could be
imposed under FACE could theoretically be devalued such that it is less
than what can be imposed for a petty offense. In other words, had Judge
Posner posited a different base year, it is possible that the fine under
FACE was less in real dollars than the statutory maximum petty offense
fine in effect for that same base year. For purposes of the next two calcu-
lations, the base year will be 1968, as it is the year that Duncan v. Louisi-
ana was decided.269 In the Duncan opinion, it was noted that, at that
time, the maximum fine that could be imposed for a federal petty offense
was $500.27 0 The CPI in 1968 was 34.8.271 Thus, for the following two
equations, CPI(X) can be stated as 34.8. For our first equation, we can
take the year that the fine for petty offenses was increased to $5,000,
1988, as CPI(Y). The CPI for 1988 was 118.3.272 This allows CPI(Y) to
equal 118.3, and the current dollar price to equal $5,000. Thus stated, the
equation is:
34.8
x $5,000 = $1,470.84 [Equation 5]
118.3
Thus, the real dollar value of a petty offense fine in 1988 was $1,470.84,
almost three times the value of the $500 petty offense fine in 1968 was
$500.
In the second calculation, 1994 will be the (Y) year and the FACE fine
will be the current dollar price. The CDP, therefore, is $10,000. The CPI
was 148.2 in 1994.273 So let CPI(Y) equal 148.2. The equation is as
follows:
34.8 x $10,000 = $2,348.18 [Equation 6]
148.2
267. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1379 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
507 (1996) (finding that the increased fine was not sufficiently severe as to make the of-
fense serious).
268. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 19, 3571(b)(6)-(7) (1994) (imposing a statutory maximum $5,000
fine for petty offenses); supra app., at Equations 2-4 and accompanying text.
269. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
270. See id. at 161.
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Therefore, the real dollar value of a FACE fine in 1968 dollars is
$2,348.18, which is approximately four and a half times higher than the
amount that could be imposed for a petty offense in 1968. The two sets of
equations above tend to demonstrate that the FACE fine remains much
higher than the petty offense fine.274
B. Gross Domestic Product Implicit Price Deflator Analysis
As mentioned previously, the CPI has been harshly criticized for over-
estimating the rate of inflation.275 Another method of evaluating how the
cost of an item is devalued through inflation is using the Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) implicit price deflator. The GDP is "the total output of
goods and services produced by labor and property located in the United
States, valued at market prices." '276 The GDP is the primary measure of
production in the United States because it provides the best measure for
short-term analysis of the economy.277
GDP must be "deflated" in order to discount the effect that inflation
has on its value. Current GDP will reflect both the quantity of goods and
services produced as well as the increase in their prices, caused by infla-
tion.2 78 By positing a base year and giving it a deflator value of 1.00, we
can measure the effect of inflation on GDP and derive real GDP by divid-
274. It is possible to continue further back in time, calculating the devaluation of the
fine at various points. In fact, it might very well disprove this analysis by selecting a base
year so far back, for example, 1934, that it does prove to be less than that fine. See 18
U.S.C. § 541 (1934) (defining petty offenses as those punishable by six months in prison
and a fine of $500). The fact remains, however, that the petty offense fine has probably
been even smaller than that in our history, and therefore Judge Posner's suggestion might
again be subject to the same concerns raised in this appendix. If the fine was $5 at some
point in history, the fact that we might, through inflation, reduce the FACE fine to $10 for
that same base year only proves that the fine is still, after all those years, greater than the
express statutory definition of Congress. The rate of inflation, it would seem, begs larger
questions than it may be able to analyze. See infra text following note 288 (questioning
whether the tools of economics allow us to measure how an offense is viewed by society).
It should be noted that the equations in this appendix are a very basic attempt to use
economic analysis to measure some effect that economic forces have on the value of crimi-
nal fines. Whether fines adequately deter criminal conduct is a separate matter entirely,
one that is beyond the scope of this Note. See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW, §7.2 at 223-29 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing Judge Posner's view of the
utility of fines in deterring criminal conduct); Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling
Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519, 540-41 (1996) (discussing the economic
effects of the stigma imposed by a criminal conviction).
275. See BosKIN COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 226, at 20-64 (discussing the various
biases and shortcomings of the CPI as a measure of the rate of inflation).
276. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 447.
277. See id. at 447-48. Prior to 1991, the Gross National Product was used for this
purpose. See id. at 447.
278. See WONNACOIT & WONNACO-I, supra note 226, § 22-3(A), at 673.
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ing the current GDP by the graph value of the GDP deflator.27 9 By this
method, it is also possible to determine the GDP deflator if both the cur-
rent GDP and real GDP are known. This calculation would be achieved
by dividing the current GDP by the real GDP:
GDP(C) - GDP Deflator [Equation 7]
GDP(R)
Once determined, the GDP deflator could be divided into the current
price of any good to determine its real price.
In the 1995 version of the Statistical Abstract of the United States, the
base year, or "constant dollar" year is 1987.18° GDP values are available
through 1994.281 As in Part A of this Appendix, the years 1987-1994 will
be used as they span the period encompassing the enactment of the most
recent changes to the federal fines structure, as well as the base year for
GDP measurement, and the year that FACE was enacted.282 First, it is
necessary to determine the value of the GDP deflator for this analysis.
The current dollar value of the GDP in 1994 was 6,738.4, and the real
dollar value of the GDP for that year was 5,344.0.283 The equation is
therefore:
6,738.4 = 1.2609 [Equation 8]
5,344.0
So, for the next two equations, our GDP deflator value will be 1.2609.
As in Part A of this Appendix, the first equation will be the value of the
FACE fine-$10,000-devalued from 1987-94.2' The equation can thus
be stated as:
10,000 = $7,930.84 [Equation 9]
1.2609
279. See id. § 22-3(A), at 672-73 and Figure 22-1.
280. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 451, tbl. 699.
281. See id.
282. See 18 U.S.C. § 19, § 3571(b)(6)-(7) (1994); STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note
256, at 451, tbl. 699. It must be noted that later comparison to calculations using the CPI
will be imperfect, as the CPI calculations use a base year of 1988, while the GDP implicit
price deflator uses a base year of 1987. The difference between the two results, however,
will be minimal. See infra app., Equations 8-10, and notes 285-88 and accompanying text.
283. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 256, at 451, tbl. 699 (number in billions of
dollars).
284. See 18 U.S.C. § 248(b)(2).
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Comparing this to our result in Equation 3 of part (A) of this appendix,
which gave us a devaluation value of $7,982.46, we see that the difference
in value is only $52.46.285
The next calculation necessary is to measure the devaluation of the
maximum petty offense fine, $5,000, that § 19 of Title 18 specifies.286
Again, it will be measured over the years 1987-1994:
5,0001.209 $3,965.42 [Equation 10]1.2609
Thus, the petty offense value after inflation is $3,965.42. Comparing
this figure to the figure we calculated in Equation 4, $3,991.23, we find
that there is a difference of $25.81.287 The relatively minor differences
between the amounts calculated using the CPI and the GDP deflator
demonstrate, in both instances, that even after inflation, the FACE fine is
approximately twice as large as the petty offense fine.288
Having proven this, the question arises: what does this matter? All
that has been shown is that one number is larger than the next. Depend-
ing upon the relative buying power of a person, one might have the
means to consider the larger cost "petty," while another person might
consider the smaller cost "serious." The petty offense exception is not
based on the location of the mythical "criminal consumer" on the crimi-
nal fines indifference curve. To phrase it another way, does Judge Pos-
ner's interjection of the rate of inflation into the petty offense exception
debate beg the larger question: do the tools of economics (here, deval-
uing a fine through price inflation) truly allow us to answer a question of
subjective values-that being whether an offense is considered by the leg-
islature to be "petty" or "serious," and whether defendants charged with
"petty" offenses have the right to a trial by jury?
285. See supra app., at Equation 3 (finding a devaluation value of $7,982.46 for the
years 1988-94 using the CPI to measure inflation).
286. See 18 U.S.C. § 19, § 3571(b)(6)-(7) (maximum fine of $5,000 for Class B misde-
meanors, Class C misdemeanors, and infractions).
287. See supra app., at Equation 4 (using the CPI to show that the cost of a petty of-
fense fine had been devalued to $3,991.23 over the years 1988-1994).
288. See United States v. Soderna, 82 F.3d 1370, 1378 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 117 S. Ct.
507 (1996); supra app., at Equations 3-4, 9-10.
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